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VIDEOS? 
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SARAH LUSTBADER** 
ABSTRACT 
Numerous cities, states, and localities have adopted police body 
camera programs to enhance police accountability in the wake of repeated 
instances of police misconduct, as well as recent reports of more deep-
seated police problems. These body camera programs hold great promise 
to achieve accountability, often backed by millions of dollars in federal 
grants.  
But so far, this promise of accountability has gone largely unrealized, 
in part because police departments exercise near-total control over body 
camera programs and the videos themselves. In fact, the police view these 
programs chiefly as a tool of ordinary law enforcement rather than 
accountability—as helpful for gathering evidence against individuals in 
cases of resisting arrest, drug possession, vandalism, and so on.  
This disturbing drift has undermined the promise of body camera 
programs in two ways: first, police control erodes accountability. Police 
control the videos themselves and resist disclosure, making it impossible 
for communities to hold them accountable for misconduct. 
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Second—the chief focus of this article—using these videos in ordinary 
law enforcement exacerbates the pernicious discovery asymmetry in the 
criminal justice system, affording police and prosecutors early access to 
these videos, but depriving defendants and their counsel of the very same 
evidence. Defendants once again find themselves pleading guilty or 
preparing for trial without access to the evidence against them or worse, 
evidence that might be exculpatory.  
We therefore propose a solution: shift ownership and control of police 
body camera videos from police departments to a neutral police 
accountability agency. This move would solve both problems: first, this 
new agency would disclose videos to the public and the media, especially 
in high-profile cases, according to neutral rules calibrated to enhance 
accountability. Second, this agency would disclose these videos in 
ordinary criminal cases to both sides equally—affording criminal 
defendants timely access to crucial evidence, which will promote a more 
just, accurate, and efficient criminal justice system. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol95/iss2/5
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INTRODUCTION 
Imagine if police departments across the nation sought funding for a 
new program described as follows: “We propose a video surveillance 
program targeted toward heavily patrolled low-income neighborhoods of 
color in order to gather evidence of crimes such as drug possession, 
vandalism, and resisting arrest. We will primarily use this evidence to 
prosecute criminal cases against civilians—not police officers—
withholding it from defendants to encourage pleas, and allowing access 
only to those who take the risk of going to trial. The public and the media 
will rarely, if ever, gain access to these videos, and we will release them at 
our unilateral discretion; we will, of course, own and control all the 
footage.” If this were the avowed purpose and description of a program, 
few would support it. Yet this is precisely how most police body camera 
programs are currently run. 
Over the past few years, scores of major cities, regional hubs, and 
smaller towns have begun to deploy body cameras on their police officers 
to provide fuller evidence of the interactions between officers and 
civilians.1 Nearly every large city plans eventually to use them—95% 
according to a recent survey.2 Proponents argue that body cameras will 
keep officers accountable by deterring unlawful or abusive conduct3 and 
reducing citizen complaints.4 In 2014, then-President Obama promised 
$75 million for body camera programs,5 and cities such as New York,6 
Baltimore, and Los Angeles have launched their own programs,7 often in 
the face of allegations of police misconduct or abuse.  
 
 
1.   See infra 0. 
2.   Mike Maciag, Survey: Almost All Police Departments Plan to Use Body Cameras, 
GOVERNING THE STATES AND LOCALITIES (Jan. 26, 2016), https://perma.cc/A57A-FTZZ.  
3.   E.g., Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 668, 685 n.66 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (noting 
body cameras will deter police abuse such as offensive language, racial slurs, or excessive force). See 
infra 0. 
4.   Barak Ariel et al., “Contagious Accountability:” A Global Multisite Randomized Controlled 
Trial on the Effect of Police Body-Worn Cameras on Citizens’ Complaints Against the Police, 44 
CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 293 (2017) (93% drop in citizen complaints). 
5.   Justin Sink, Obama to Provide Funding for 50,000 Police Body Cameras, THE HILL (Dec. 1, 
2014), https://perma.cc/GQL5-BM2K. Over the past two years, as part of the Body-Worn Camera 
(BWC) Policy and Implementation Program, the Bureau of Justice Assistance provided 179 awards to 
state, local, and tribal law enforcement organizations totaling over $41 million. BUREAU OF JUSTICE 
ASSISTANCE, U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE, UPDATE: FISCAL YEAR 2016, BODY-WORN CAMERA PROGRAM 
1 (2016). 
6.   See Ashley Southall, Do Body Cameras Help Policing? 1,200 New York Officers Aim to 
Find Out, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 2017; Floyd, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 685 (ordering New York City to 
implement a pilot program to address widespread constitutional violations by the police). 
7.   See infra 0. 
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At the same time, body camera proponents separately pitched these 
programs to police departments as a tool of ordinary law enforcement, 
leading to their widespread adoption.  
But in an often unremarked development, police have taken control of 
body camera programs and—most damaging—they have claimed sole 
ownership of the videos themselves.8 They decide which system to buy; 
they determine how to configure those systems; they decide when and how 
to activate the cameras; they control who may have access to the videos 
and when; and they determine how long to keep the videos, and whether to 
destroy them.9 Most policy makers assume such police control falls within 
the natural order of things. Why shouldn’t police departments control the 
programs, own the videos, and control their disclosure? 
We argue that police control threatens to undermine these body camera 
programs in their infancy.10 First, police control erodes accountability, 
leaving body cameras to fulfill only their law enforcement function. Police 
control of body camera programs allows police to determine which 
interactions to record, which to reveal to the public, and which to 
destroy.11 Police in cities such as Los Angeles, San Francisco, Washington 
D.C., Albuquerque, and Baton Rouge have turned off, blocked, failed to 
activate, or otherwise interfered with the recording of controversial and 
potentially unlawful police conduct.12  
And where controversial, often fatal, encounters are recorded, time and 
again, police have resisted disclosing these videos, often in cases where 
 
 
8.   For example, New York City’s proposed body camera regulation expressly makes body 
camera videos the “property of the New York City Police Department.” See New York City Police 
Department Operations Order, Body-Worn Cameras—Pilot Program II (June 26, 2016) (draft for 
public comment) [hereinafter NYC Draft Regulation] (outlining field use of body cameras for 
uniformed officers only), available at https://perma.cc/T53F-7YF3; AURORA POLICE DEP’T, 
DIRECTIVE MANUAL 16.04, BODY WORN CAMERAS (2016); see also BALT. CTY. POLICE DEP’T, 
BODY-WORN CAMERA USE POLICY (2016) ("System recordings are the property of the Department."), 
available at https://perma.cc/HTJ7-L4ES; CH. POLICE DEP’T, SPECIAL ORDER S03-14: BODY WORN 
CAMERAS (2016) ("All digitally recorded data created with the BWC are the property of the Chicago 
Police Department."), available at https://perma.cc/7HWX-3KFQ; Miami-Dade Cty. POLICE DEP’T, 
DIRECTIVE 16–18: REVISION TO THE DEPARTMENTAL MANUAL, NEW POLICY (2016), available at 
https://perma.cc/UPM9-CPNF; OAKLAND POLICE DEP’T, ORDER I-15.1: PORTABLE VIDEO 
MANAGEMENT SYSTEM 5 (2014), available at https://perma.cc/4B6B-678F. 
9.   See infra 0; Kate Mather, Why Some of the Most Controversial Police Shootings Aren't on 
Video, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 2, 2017), https://perma.cc/9AK4-T2U9. 
10.  It will not be the first time a federal funding program for local police has had the unfortunate 
effect of increasing the expanse and intrusiveness of local policing. Rachel Harmon, Federal 
Programs and the Real Costs of Policing, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 870, 872 (2015) (noting that federally-
funded programs “provide incentives to local police departments to conduct additional arrests, use 
force, intimidate citizens, take private property, and engage in electronic surveillance of individuals”). 
11.  Cf. Melendres v. Arpaio, 784 F.3d 1254, 1266 (9th Cir. 2015) (requiring videotaping of 
traffic stops based in part on sheriff department’s destruction of evidence.) 
12.  See infra 0. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol95/iss2/5
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doing so also helps them avoid accountability. They enjoy this power to 
conceal because in nearly every jurisdiction, laws, regulations, or police 
policy give them sole ownership and control of the videos.13  
The shooting of teenager Laquan McDonald in Chicago in 2014 
illustrates how police control of body camera video stymies 
accountability. When a Chicago police officer shot McDonald sixteen 
times, killing him, several dashboard cameras were rolling.14 Police on the 
scene nevertheless claimed, falsely, that McDonald was lunging at them 
with a knife before he was killed,15 apparently confident the videos would 
never be released. Indeed, the police department fought release until a 
court ordered their disclosure a year later.16 Only then did the public learn 
the truth: McDonald was walking away from police when he was killed.17 
The day of the videos’ release—but a year after prosecutors first viewed 
the videos—the authorities charged Officer Jason Van Dyke with first-
degree murder, making him the first Chicago police officer in decades to 
be charged with murder for an on-duty incident.18 Police videos, and body 
cameras in particular, can help officer-community relations by promoting 
accountability, but not when police have unilateral control of the videos.   
At the same time, police control of body camera videos creates a 
second problem. Police are increasingly using police and surveillance 
video in prosecuting ordinary criminal cases,19 including misdemeanors 
such as resisting arrest20 and more serious drug offenses.21 The numbers 
reveal an uncomfortable truth: body camera videos are used far more often 
 
 
13.  See infra 0. 
14.  Jeremy Gorner & Jason Meisner, FBI Investigating Death of Teen Shot 16 Times by Chicago 
Cop, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 14, 2015. 
15.  Monica Davey, Officers’ Statements Differ from Video in Death of Laquan McDonald, N.Y. 
TIMES, DEC. 5, 2015. 
16.  Nausheen Husain, Data: Laquan McDonald Timeline: The Shooting, the Video and the 
Fallout, CHI. TRIB., JAN. 13, 2017. 
17.  Monica Davey & Mitch Smith, Video of Chicago Police Shooting a Teenager is Ordered 
Released, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2015. 
18.  Monica Davey & Mitch Smith, Chicago Protests Mostly Peaceful After Video of Police 
Shooting is Released, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 2015. 
19.  V. Noah Gimbel, Body Cameras and Criminal Discovery, 104 GEO. L. J. 1581, 1584 (2016) 
(“[B]eyond serving as an instrument of police accountability, BWCs are also capable of producing 
countless terabytes of video evidence for use in criminal prosecutions.”). 
20.  State v. Herrin, No. 1 CA-CR 12-0141, 2012 WL 3233227, at *2 (Ariz. Ct. App. Aug. 9, 
2012) (dash camera video admitted to show defendant resisted arrest); State v. Gibbons, No. 2012-UP-
177, 2012 WL 10841329, at *1 (S.C. Ct. App. Mar. 14, 2012) (video played to show resisting and 
harassment); Sturgeon v. State, No. 01-94-00355-CR, 1995 WL 71430, at *6 (Tex. Ct. App. Feb. 23, 
1995) (surveillance video admitted to show defendant resisted arrest). 
21.  United States v. Cejas, 761 F.3d 717, 722 (7th Cir. 2014) (hidden video mounted on pole); 
State v. Gibbs, 775 S.E.2d 925 (Table), 2015 WL 4094231, at *1 (N.C. Ct. App. July 7, 2015) (body 
camera video from undercover officer recording drug transaction). 
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against ordinary citizens than the police. According to a recent survey of 
lead prosecutors, 92.6% report their office has used them against private 
citizens and only 8.3% against police officers.22  
Use of video for ordinary criminal law enforcement is not itself the 
main problem. But police control of these videos means that criminal 
defendants do not have equal or timely access to these videos, thus 
exacerbating the pernicious discovery asymmetry already infecting the 
criminal justice system.23  
The primary focus of this Article, therefore, is this more hidden 
development—police control of body camera video exacerbates the 
unfairness already deeply entrenched in the criminal justice system. Police 
and prosecutors leverage their control of body camera footage to pursue 
ordinary criminal cases. In these prosecutions, the government may 
withhold these videos from defendants until after a plea, after a 
suppression motion, and perhaps up to the eve of trial. For the 94% of 
state-level criminal defendants whose cases end in plea bargains, not 
trials,24 they may never see the video evidence in their own case. This 
asymmetry merely adds to the long list of evidence to which police and 
prosecutors enjoy unilateral access, evidence often central to a criminal 
case.25 
We say prosecutors “leverage” the videos and “withhold” them, but in 
reality, they simply treat the videos as another type of discovery,26 another 
relevant piece of evidence that they do not have to disclose until well after 
first appearance, arraignment, bail argument, and even guilty plea. With 
some noteworthy, recent exceptions, such as Texas,27 defendants are not 
entitled to receive police reports, witness statements, 911 calls, radio runs, 
lab reports, and other relevant evidence in a timely fashion—they very 
often plead guilty without ever having seen them.28  
This asymmetry unfairly deprives defendants of timely, relevant 
 
 
22.  LINDA MEROLA ET AL., CTR. FOR EVIDENCE-BASE CRIME POLICY, GEORGE MASON UNIV., 
BODY WORN CAMERAS AND THE COURTS: A NATIONAL SURVEY OF STATE PROSECUTORS 5 (2016), 
available at https://perma.cc/M32V-4DM8. The authors report this as a key finding but warn that far 
more total citizens are prosecuted than police—“so these percentages are not directly comparable.” Id. 
23.  See infra Part IV(a).  
24.  Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 133, 143 (2012) (noting that 94% of state defendants and 97% of 
federal defendants plead guilty).  
25.  See infra Part IV(a). 
26.  N.Y.C. POLICE DEP’T, NYPD RESPONSE TO PUBLIC AND OFFICER INPUT ON THE 
DEPARTMENT’S PROPOSED BODY-WORN CAMERA POLICY 24 (2017) (confirming that body camera 
video will not be released but subject to “the standard discovery process between the prosecution and 
the defense”), available at https://perma.cc/C5JE-DTSM.  
27.  TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 39.14(j) (West 2015) (providing for discovery before 
plea). 
28.  See infra Part IV(a). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol95/iss2/5
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evidence. Body camera videos can be relevant to ordinary criminal cases 
in numerous ways. The video may show the initial stop and search by the 
police, and whether that stop was supported by reasonable suspicion under 
the Fourth Amendment.29 The video may support a charge of drug 
possession, or create doubt. Under most body camera policies, the video 
footage will likely capture the physical arrest itself, particularly relevant 
when evaluating a charge of resisting arrest, or the propriety of a search.  
Police body camera programs have thus reached an ironic crossroads: 
programs designed chiefly to instill trust and reduce friction, excessive 
force, and other misconduct in neighborhoods facing pervasive and 
intrusive policing, have instead aided that same manner of law 
enforcement in those same neighborhoods—without contributing to officer 
accountability. We must decide, what are body cameras for? 
We propose a solution to this disturbing trend: shift the ownership and 
control over videos from the police to a neutral, third-party government 
agency—a police accountability agency. This new agency would follow 
new disclosure rules. These rules would promote accountability by 
calibrating disclosure according to that value. Second, these rules would 
enhance fairness in the criminal justice system through early, symmetrical 
disclosure of footage to defendants and their counsel.  
Many scholars have written about the promise of body camera videos 
to enhance accountability,30 as well as their potential drawbacks.31 But 
even these critics fail to question the premise that police will own and 
control the actual videos. Most focus on accountability, but practically no 
one has considered how these videos further exacerbate the information 
asymmetry that pervades our criminal justice system.32 In a thoughtful 
piece, V. Noah Gimbel has argued that, pursuant to a defendant’s 
discovery rights, prosecutors should not have a monopoly on the use of 
body camera footage as evidence—but even he assumes that police will 
own and control these body camera videos and that we must address the 
 
 
29.  Mary Fan, Justice Visualized: Courts and the Body Camera Revolution, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 897, 954 (2017) (assessing likely future effect of body cameras on criminal procedure and the 
Fourth Amendment in particular); infra 0. 
30.  See infra 0. 
31.  Mary Fan, Privacy, Public Disclosure, Police Body Cameras: Policy Splits, 68 ALA L. REV. 
395, 396 (2016) (highlighting how pervasive body cameras can intrude upon individual privacy); 
Bernard E. Harcourt, Cover-Up in Chicago, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2015 (identifying how elected 
officials manipulate release of videos to ensure reelection); Howard M Wasserman, Moral Panics and 
Body Cameras, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 831, 833 (2015) (urging caution that body cameras will not solve 
police misconduct). 
32.  But see, Sarah Lustbader, The Real Problem with Police Video, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 2015; 
Gimbel, supra note 19. 
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issue in the context of a defendant’s discovery rights.33 But treating these 
videos as ordinary criminal discovery means that defendants will not 
obtain this crucial evidence in time for it to matter, just as with other 
discovery. We propose taking these videos out of the discovery regime 
entirely so that prosecutors and defense counsel alike will have equal and 
early access. 
First, our proposal would enhance transparency and accountability by 
ensuring timely disclosure of body camera videos to the public, the media, 
watchdogs, and others in high-profile cases, with appropriate 
consideration of privacy and public safety. Such timely disclosure will 
itself act as a deterrent; if the police know that misconduct will become 
public quickly—and will not languish on a police server for years—they 
will take more care. This new agency would balance disclosure against 
genuine law enforcement needs—delaying disclosure temporarily only if 
disclosure would pose a tangible and significant threat to an individual or 
an investigation. It would also take into account the privacy of civilians 
and officers, blurring and redacting identifying features where appropriate. 
But since the chief goal is accountability, these delays should be rare and 
brief. In less prominent cases too, this agency would afford early access to 
potential civil litigants so that they, perhaps with counsel, can determine 
whether they have a case or whether the police acted appropriately. 
Second, in the criminal justice sphere, our proposal would afford 
criminal defendants access to body camera videos that is symmetrical to 
the access currently afforded to criminal prosecutors. Defendants and their 
lawyers would have immediate access, via a web link, to view these 
videos in time for it to matter: at the defendant’s first appearance before a 
judge. Especially in misdemeanor cases, such timely access will afford 
defendants a fair opportunity to attack probable cause—the main purpose 
of a first appearance34—as well as to make arguments concerning bail. 
Timely access will encourage prosecutors and judges to dismiss bad cases 
outright. It will allow defendants to negotiate plea bargains with far better 
information. Since approximately 94% of state cases plead out,35 our 
proposal for symmetrical discovery access could have significant 
consequences for any case in which a body camera video is relevant 
evidence. 
 
 
33.  Gimbel, supra note 19, at 1584–86. 
34.  See generally Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975) (many jurisdictions include a “Gerstein 
hearing” to determine probable cause in their first appearance for warrantless arrests. See, e.g., 
Rothgery v. Gillespie County, Tex., 554 U.S. 191 (2008) (noting that Texas’ intitial appearance before 
a magistrate “combines the Fourth Amendment’s required probable-cause determination with the 
setting of bail”) (citing Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 103).  
35.  Frye, 566 U.S. at 143. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol95/iss2/5
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0 of this article sketches the potential benefits of body cameras, 
including accountability. It shows that the chief premise and motivation of 
these programs lies in such police accountability.  
0 shows how police department control shifts body camera programs 
from being a tool for police accountability to a tool of ordinary law 
enforcement. This Part does so primarily by discussing how such 
programs currently work, detailing the technological logistics.  
0 proposes that we take body camera footage outside police control. It 
proposes that a new, neutral oversight agency (a police accountability 
agency) possess and control body camera videos and oversee their 
disclosure to prosecutors and defense lawyers, as well as to the media and 
public. It acknowledges the shortcomings of many existing police review 
boards, but suggests that our proposed agency will have greater power 
simply because it will control the videos.  
0 presents the heart of our proposal: timely defendant access in criminal 
cases to body camera videos. This part situates our proposal within the 
larger literature of defendant discovery, plea bargaining, and the way in 
which the criminal justice system treats defendants unfairly. It proposes 
that police, prosecutors, and defense counsel have ready access via the 
internet to body camera videos taken at the time and place of the event or 
arrest.  
Finally, 0 begins a rough sketch of how such a police accountability 
agency would disclose body camera videos to the media and public, 
balancing the needs of law enforcement and privacy against the public’s 
right to keep the police accountable.   
I. THE PROMISE OF ACCOUNTABILITY 
Americans have increasingly called for both greater accountability and 
transparency in police conduct.36 Perhaps ironically, the source of these 
demands arises from what promises to be the solution: video recording of 
police activity. Before turning in later parts to the potential drawbacks of 
police body camera videos, this part briefly sketches the need for 
accountability and the great promise body cameras hold as a solution. It 
highlights that the chief driving force behind body camera programs is 
accountability.  
 
 
 
36.  See infra 0. 
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A. The Problem 
The videos are as familiar as they are disturbing. In July 2014, police 
officer Daniel Pantaleo put Eric Garner in a chokehold; cell phone video 
from a bystander recorded Garner pleading and saying, “I can’t breathe,” 
before choking to death under the weight of numerous New York police 
officers.37 In October 2014, Chicago police shot and killed a teenager 
named Laquan McDonald sixteen times. Dashboard camera video, 
released a year later, led to murder charges against officer Jason Van 
Dyke.38 In April 2015 a South Carolina police officer shot Walter Scott in 
the back, killing him.39 In July 2015, a police officer shot unarmed Samuel 
Debose during a traffic stop. Police body camera videos played a central 
role in publicizing the killing and prompting murder charges against the 
officer, Ray Tensing.40  
In these cases, and many others,41 video captured officers killing often 
unarmed, black civilians. In many of these cases, the officers made up an 
exculpatory story.  Officer Michael Slager, for example, claimed Walter 
Scott had grabbed his taser and appeared to plant a weapon at Walter 
Scott’s side.42 And in these cases, the video appeared to many viewers to 
show black men and boys gunned down by police for no good reason.43  
 For those unfamiliar with law enforcement tactics in heavily policed 
communities, these videos were shocking. For residents of those 
communities, the videos affirmed what they had been seeing—and, for 
some, decrying—for decades.44 Indeed, many statistics help to support 
these anecdotal incidents. Numerous studies show police stop, question, 
and frisk blacks and other minorities in far higher numbers than whites, 
and that racial bias plays a role in these disparities.45 Some studies show 
 
 
37.  Joseph Goldstein & Nate Schweber, Man’s Death After Chokehold Raises Old Issue for the 
Police, N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 2014. 
38.  Jason Meisner et al., Chicago Releases Dash-Cam Video of Fatal Shooting after Cop 
Charged with Murder, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 24, 2015.  
39.  Michael S Schmidt & Matt Apuzzo, South Carolina Officer is Charged with Murder of 
Walter Scott, N.Y TIMES, Apr. 7, 2015. 
40.  Robinson Meyer, Body-Camera Footage Gets an Officer Indicted for Murder, THE 
ATLANTIC (July 29, 2015), https://perma.cc/7GE4-JTME. 
41.  See, e.g., Richard Fausset, Richard Perez-Pena & Campbell Robertson, Alton Sterling 
Shooting in Baton Rouge Prompts Justice Dept. Investigation, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 2016; Jeremy 
Gorner, Report: Paul O'Neal Shot After Officer Said He Reached into Waistband, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 13, 
2016; Peter Holley & Katie Zezima, White Tulsa Officer Charged in Death of Unarmed Black Man, 
Freed on Bond, WASH. POST (Sept. 23, 2016), https://perma.cc/4MFD-WUJY. 
42.  Michael S. Schmidt & Matt Apuzzo, supra note 39. 
43.  Id.; Robinson Meyer, supra note 40. 
44.  See generally Tom R. Tyler et al., Street Stops and Police Legitimacy: Teachable Moments 
in Young Urban Men’s Legal Socialization, 11 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 751 (2014).  
45.  See, e.g., Roland G. Fryer, Jr., An Empirical Analysis of Racial Differences in Police Use of 
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that police kill blacks more often than whites,46 but at least one recent 
study may draw these conclusions into doubt.47  
B. The Body-Camera Solution 
In response to the killings and other abuses caught on video, a broad 
coalition of voices, from the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) to 
law enforcement, has called for police to wear body cameras—both to help 
prevent and deter future misconduct and to document it when it does 
occur.48 And many have praised the great potential to improve policing 
that these programs hold, though others have begun to question whether 
these body camera programs will reduce unlawful police use of force.49 
Even if the programs do not reduce unlawful use of force, many say they 
will at least hold police accountable after the fact. 
 
 
Force (July 2016), available at https://perma.cc/KUC9-VPRC; Andrew Gelman et al., An Analysis of 
the New York City Police Department’s “Stop-and-Frisk” Policy in the Context of Claims of Racial 
Bias, 102 J. AM. STAT. ASS’N. 813, 821–22 (2007); LYNN LANGSTON & MATTHEW DUROSE, U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STAT., SPECIAL REPORT: 
POLICE BEHAVIOR DURING TRAFFIC AND STREET STOPS 2011 (2013); S. F. DIST. ATT’Y, BLUE 
RIBBON PANEL ON TRANSPARENCY, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND FAIRNESS IN LAW ENFORCEMENT, 
REPORT 28 (2016) (finding "racial disparities regarding SFPD stops, searches, and arrests, particularly 
for Black people"), available at https://perma.cc/A9WC-AMWZ. 
46.  See, e.g., Cody T. Ross, A Multi-Level Bayesian Analysis of Racial Bias in Police Shootings 
at the County-Level in the United States, 2011–2014, PLoS ONE 10(11): e0141854 (2015) (finding 
that the probability of being black, unarmed, and shot by police is about 3.49 times the probability of 
being white, unarmed, and shot by police on average). 
47.  Fryer, supra note 45, at Abstract (for “officer-involved shootings – we find no racial 
differences in either the raw data or when contextual factors are taken into account.”).  
48.  See, e.g., Press Release, The Leadership Conference on Civil and Human Rights, Civil 
Rights, Privacy, and Media Rights Groups Release Principles for Law Enforcement Body Worn 
Cameras (May 15, 2015) (signed by thirty-four rights groups including the ACLU, NAACP, Data & 
Society, and Electronic Frontier Foundation), available at https://perma.cc/4GUN-PHP7?type=image; 
Brianna Keilar & Dan Merica, Hillary Clinton Calls for Mandatory Police Body Cameras, End 'Era of 
Mass Incarceration', CNN (Apr. 29, 2015), available at https://perma.cc/8JSK-2DZJ; Carrie Dann & 
Andrew Rafferty, Obama Requests $263 Million for Police Body Cameras, Training, NBC NEWS 
(Dec. 1, 2014), https://perma.cc/U5B5-BD9Q; Press Release, U.S. Senator Brian Schatz of Hawaii, 
Sen. Schatz, Paul & Reps. Brown, Ellison, Cummings Introduce Bipartisan Legislation to Help 
Expand Responsible Use of Police Body Cameras (Mar. 26, 2015), available at 
https://perma.cc/PQH2-X5ZY; Paul Chambers, Hayward Police Officers Push for City to Fund Body 
Cameras, KTVU NEWS (July 5, 2015), https://perma.cc/AW5Y-34RB; Megan Cassidy, Phoenix 
Officials Push to Buy Body Cameras for all Patrol Officers, AZ CENTRAL (Feb. 8, 2016), 
https://perma.cc/88L3-22N3; Bailey Hicks, Carolina Beach Police Push for 30 New Body Cameras, 
WECT6, Apr. 7, 2016; Chad Marlow & Jay Stanley, ACLU, We’re Updating Our Police Body 
Camera Recommendations for Even Better Accountability and Civil Liberties Protections, FREE 
FUTURE BLOG (Jan. 25, 2017), https://perma.cc/DDZ5-L569.  
49.  See, e.g., CYNTHIA LUM ET AL., EXISTING AND ONGOING BODY WORN CAMERA RESEARCH: 
KNOWLEDGE GAPS AND OPPORTUNITIES 11 (2015) (Reviewing all empirical studies and concluding 
that it is too early to draw definitive conclusions; some studies, for example, show reduced use of 
force, whereas others show higher rates of arrest.), available at https://perma.cc/57PU-WGG6.  
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Then-Attorney General Loretta Lynch described her hopes for body 
camera programs as follows: “Body-worn cameras hold tremendous 
promise for enhancing transparency, promoting accountability, and 
advancing public safety for law enforcement officers and the communities 
they serve.”50 The ACLU has characterized body cameras as “a win for 
all,” as long as privacy safeguards are implemented.51 The Washington 
D.C. Police Complaints Board’s report and recommendation on body 
cameras found “several” potential benefits to such a program, citing “the 
potential to enhance public safety and improve relations between police 
and members of the public by reducing misconduct, facilitating the 
resolution of incidents that arise, and improving officer training.”52 The 
report also noted that body cameras can enhance “public confidence in the 
criminal justice system.”53  
In New York, a federal court in 2013 found that the New York Police 
Department’s stop and frisk program violated the federal constitution and 
ordered the police department to develop a pilot body camera program. In 
doing so, it found that body cameras are “uniquely suited to addressing the 
constitutional harms at issue in this case.”54 These cameras would 
accomplish this goal by allowing police supervisors to monitor the 
recordings, preserving them to verify complaints against the police, and 
evaluate the effectiveness of the body cameras. The court appointed a 
monitor to make sure this all happened.55 The pilot program began in April 
2017.56 
With these high hopes, programs are proliferating, from large cities to 
smaller towns and even colleges.57 On the federal side, in December of 
2014, then-President Obama promised $75 million toward purchasing 
50,000 body cameras, part of a larger program.58 As part of this promise, 
 
 
50.  Mark Berman, Justice Dept. Will Spend $20 Million on Police Body Cameras Nationwide, 
WASH. POST (May 1, 2015), https://perma.cc/KAV3-288U. 
51.  JAY STANLEY, ACLU, POLICE BODY-MOUNTED CAMERAS: WITH RIGHT POLICIES IN 
PLACE, A WIN FOR ALL, VERSION 2.0 1 (2013), available at https://perma.cc/4G4N-S2KE.  
52.  D.C. OFFICE OF POLICE COMPLAINTS, POLICE COMPLAINTS BD., ENHANCING POLICE 
ACCOUNTABILITY THROUGH AN EFFECTIVE ON-BODY CAMERA PROGRAM FOR MPD OFFICERS 2 
(2014), available at https://perma.cc/LC9X-KFQP. 
53.  Id. 
54.  Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 668, 685 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
55.  Id. at 676. 
56.  Southall, supra note 8. 
57.  THE LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE ON CIVIL AND HUMAN RIGHTS & UPTURN, POLICE BODY 
WORN CAMERAS: A POLICY SCORECARD (2016), available at https://perma.cc/G4LB-NA7M; 
BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE, POLICE BODY-WORN CAMERA POLICIES (2016), available at 
https://perma.cc/G4P8-Y9FH; Nancy Doolittle, Cornell Police Implements Body-Camera Program, 
CORNELL CHRONICLE (Feb. 2, 2017), https://perma.cc/KU8U-4CCD. 
58.  Sink, supra note 5. 
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the Department of Justice allocated $20 million for pilot body camera 
programs.59 The Bureau of Justice Assistance has awarded $41 million to 
law enforcement agencies over the past two years through its body-worn 
camera program.60  
States and localities,61 along with some private organizations, have also 
begun funding body camera programs. Nearly every large police 
department, 95%, report they have body cameras or plan to employ 
them.62 The Police Executive Research Forum (PERF) body camera 
survey of 500 law enforcement agencies, conducted in August of 2013, 
found that among the 254 agencies that responded, approximately one-
quarter reported that they already used body cameras.63 More recent 
estimates by the Department of Justice (DOJ) say approximately 4000–
6000 agencies currently use the technology.64 More than thirty states now 
have legislation relating to body cameras.65 
Body cameras represent only one response to police misconduct. Many 
departments have committed to better training, particularly in de-
escalation techniques, better relations with the communities they patrol, 
and other more specific improvements. Beyond the police, private citizens 
have already sought to keep the police accountable by recording their 
actions with cell phone cameras. It is important to note that the vast 
majority of the abusive police conduct captured on video over the past few 
years has been the result of civilian bystander filming, not police video. 
Several communities have formed organized groups to regularly monitor 
the police through cell phone recording, with the hope of both deterring 
 
 
59.  Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Office of Public Affairs, Justice Department Announces $20 
Million in Funding to Support Body-Worn Camera Pilot Program (May 1, 2015), available at 
https://perma.cc/V6X4-DGWR.  
60.  BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, supra note 5, at 1. 
61.  See, e.g., Eric Markowitz, Police Departments Face a Crucial Question: How To Pay For 
Body Cameras?, INT’L BUS. TIMES, May 12, 2016; Press Release, State of Conn. Office of Policy & 
Mgmt., Body-Worn Recording Equipment (BWRE) Reimbursement Grant Program for Local and 
University Law Enforcement Agencies (Mar. 2, 2016) (The Connecticut Department of Policy and 
Management announced “the availability of grants-in-aid to municipal law enforcement agencies and 
state university police forces . . . for body-worn recording equipment and digital data storage devices 
or services.”), available at https://perma.cc/Y34U-GBEU.  
62.  Maciag, supra note 2 (a survey by the Major Cities Chiefs Association and Major County 
Sheriffs’ Association reported 95% plan to use body cameras). 
63.  U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COMMUNITY ORIENTED POLICING SERVICES, POLICE EXEC. 
RESEARCH FORUM, IMPLEMENTING A BODY-WORN CAMERA PROGRAM 2 (2014), available at 
https://perma.cc/23QS-LH4R. 
64.  U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, BODY-WORN CAMERA TOOLKIT: 
NATIONAL LANDSCAPE, available at https://perma.cc/5SZ5-SA54.  
65.  National Conference of State Legislatures, Body-Worn Cameras Interactive Graphic (2016), 
available at https://perma.cc/DUA7-FXD6. 
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bad conduct and saying, symbolically, we are watching.66 
Nevertheless, body cameras have become perhaps the most widespread 
organized response to communities’ cries for accountability, reflecting the 
hope that they will bring about many improvements, including deterring 
police abuse, quickly resolving complaints against the police, and 
enhancing democracy and transparency more generally. 
C. Accountability 
Those promoting body camera programs primarily insist we must 
deploy them to keep the police accountable. They claim that the programs 
will do so by deterring police from using excessive force in the first place. 
If police know their conduct will appear on the nightly news, they are less 
likely to use excessive force. In cases where police do use excessive force, 
those promoting body camera progams hope that these videos will also 
provide evidence to hold individual officers, or police departments, 
accountable, whether through criminal prosecutions or civil remedies. 
Finally, proponents believe that these programs will reduce false 
accusations of police abuse,67 and provide evidence of appropriate and 
even heroic police conduct.68  
We accept the premise that body cameras have the potential to enhance 
accountability in these ways. Our chief point is that police ownership and 
control of body camera programs and videos will undermine each of these 
avenues of accountability. Shifting control over the programs and the 
videos to a trusted, neutral, police accountability agency, by contrast, will 
promote each of the methods, as further elaborated below. 
The remainder of this Part and 0 will elaborate on how body cameras 
should promote accountability and how police control threatens to 
undermine each of those methods. In 0 we focus on the complementary 
problem: this same police control of body camera videos, ironically, 
exacerbates the unfairness in the ordinary criminal justice system.  
1. Deterrence 
Many have argued police and citizens will behave better when they 
know they are being watched and recorded by police body cameras.69 
 
 
66.  Jocelyn Simonson, Copwatching, 104 CAL. L. REV. 391, 407 (2016). 
67.  Ariel, supra note 4. 
68.  Julie Bosman, Hollywood-Style Heroism is Latest Trend in Police Videos, N.Y. TIMES, MAY 
28, 2017. 
69.   Ariel, supra note 4; Barak Ariel & Tony Farrar, Police Found., Self-Awareness to Being 
Watched and Socially-Desirable Behavior: A Field Experiment on the Effect of Body-Worn Cameras 
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Preliminary evidence appears to support this theory,70 although some 
studies find no positive effect.71 In the now-famous study conducted in 
Rialto, California, researchers asked whether body cameras would lead to 
an increase in “socially-desirable behavior” on the part of police officers. 
They found that over the course of one year with body cameras, use-of-
force incidents decreased by over 50% compared to control conditions. 
Not only did the police use less force, but citizen complaints against police 
decreased by 90%.  
Another pilot study, conducted in Mesa, Arizona, found a 75% drop in 
use-of-force complaints and a 40% reduction in citizen complaints against 
officers.72 A separate study on the impact of body cameras conducted with 
the Orlando Police Department concluded that over the course of one year 
with cameras, use-of-force incidents fell by 53% among officers using the 
cameras, while civilian complaints against those officers fell by 65%.73  
On the other hand, no one has appeared to study whether body cameras 
or their videos have led to greater accountability of individual officers 
after misconduct. 
2. Post-Hoc Evidence 
One can imagine policy-makers, watchdogs, and others taking a more 
methodical approach to police departments overall, relying on scores or 
 
 
on Police Use-of-Force 8 (2013) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://perma.cc/74NX-AB74. 
“It seems that knowing with sufficient certainty that our behavior is being observed or judged affects 
various social cognitive processes: We experience public self-awareness, become more prone to 
socially-acceptable behavior and sense a heightened need to cooperate with rules.” Id. at 2–3. 
70.  See, e.g., Darren Henstock & Barak Ariel, Testing the Effects of Police Body-Worn Cameras 
on Use of Force During Arrests: A Randomised Controlled Trial in a Large British Police Force, 
EUROPEAN J. CRIMINOLOGY 1, 2  (Jan. 16, 2017) ("Overall, we found a 50 percent reduction in the 
odds of force used when BWCs are present compared with control conditions . . . . However, the effect 
concentrates in open-hand tactics (physical restraints and non-compliant handcuffing), with no 
discernible effect on categories of more aggressive force responses (for example, dogs, Tasers, batons, 
pepper spray)."); Justin T. Ready & Jacob T.N. Young, The Impact of On-Officer Video Cameras on 
Police–Citizen Contacts: Findings from a Controlled Experiment in Mesa, AZ, 11 J. EXPERIMENTAL 
CRIMINOLOGY 445, 445 (2015).  
71.  See Zusha Elinson, Police Body Cameras Don't Reduce Use of Force: Study, WALL ST. J., 
Nov. 23, 2016 (discussing preliminary results in Milwaukee, Spokane, and Tempe). 
72.  RYAN STOKES & LEE RANKIN, MESA POLICE DEP’T, PROGRAM EVALUATION & 
RECOMMENDATIONS: ON-OFFICER BODY CAMERA SYSTEM (2013), available at 
https://perma.cc/4GB3-NPNA. 
73.   See Wesley G. Jennings, Matthew D. Lynch & Lorie A. Fridell, Evaluating the 
Impact of Police Officer Body-Worn Cameras (BWCs): The Orlando Police Department (OPD) 
Experience, 43 J. CRIM. JUSTICE 480, 480 (2015). See also Nick Wing, Study Shows Less Violence, 
Fewer Complaints When Cops Wear Body Cameras, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 13, 2015), 
https://perma.cc/DM8N-3WNM; Mitch Perry, USF/Orlando PD Study Finds Police Body Cameras 
Reduce Citizen Complaints, FLA. POLITICS (Oct. 12, 2015), https://perma.cc/8E8D-8DTA.  
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hundreds of videos to recommend systemic improvements in training and 
policy. That is, the body camera videos would further accountability 
department-wide.  
Of course, this type of accountability requires an independent agency—
and one that has control of all body camera videos—and not simply those 
that might come into its hands on a sporadic basis. This is precisely what 
jurisdictions have failed to do, and what we propose: a dedicated agency 
collecting body camera videos to study and draw more generalized 
conclusions for improved police conduct.  
Meanwhile, such an agency would also address individual cases. It 
would use videos to sanction individual officers, to decide complaints, and 
award money damages. It would also use them to establish larger policy 
goals to reduce injury and death through de-escalation techniques, for 
example.  
3. Claims Against the Police 
Body camera videos will provide evidence for those bringing claims 
against the police for excessive force or other unlawful conduct. These 
may be administrative actions or law suits under Section 198374 or state 
law. These claims can, of course, deter future police misconduct, if 
enforced, but their primary purpose will be to provide a remedy for those 
aggrieved by police misconduct.  
In the ordinary case the remedy will be money damages for individuals. 
But in cases involving widespread abuse, plaintiffs could seek injunctive 
relief. Plaintiffs could bring class actions or the Department of Justice 
could bring its own law suits based upon body camera videos. Of course, 
in these instances plaintiffs or the DOJ would need to access a much 
broader selection of body camera videos. Our proposed police 
accountability agency would develop procedures for deciding how to 
address wide-spread problems in police departments vis-à-vis access to 
large numbers of videos.  
4. Reducing False Claims 
Proponents of body cameras also expect them to lead to quicker 
resolution of complaints against police officers: video might show which 
party was at fault, or leave less room for debate. Proponents also predict 
that body cameras will reduce the number of civilian complaints against 
 
 
74.  Newmaker v. City of Fortuna, 842 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2016) (noting in Section 1983 
lawsuit that dash camera video contradicted officer’s claim he hit the victim only twice). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol95/iss2/5
 
 
 
 
 
 
2017] BODY CAMERA VIDEOS 285 
 
 
 
 
police in the first place, because civilians will refrain from filing meritless 
complaints.75 Of course, the primary hope is to lower instances of police 
abuse overall. Body cameras might also reduce settlement payouts, which, 
in New York City, totaled nearly $1 billion over the decade ending in 
2010.76 Two European studies, one conducted in England and the other in 
Scotland, indicate that body cameras do contribute to the resolution of 
citizen complaints against police officers and may in fact reduce false 
complaints.77 In addition to the Mesa, Arizona study finding drastic 
reductions in complaints against officers,78 a separate study in Mesa found 
that officers wearing body cameras were more cautious and risk-averse 
than those who did not wear them.79 
5. Enhancing Democracy 
Body cameras promise not only to deter misconduct, but also to further 
reforms by revealing misconduct. Marc Jonathan Blitz notes that video is 
uniquely capable of engendering such reform movements: “Video footage 
is far more able than eyewitness testimony to shift the debate from 
questions about what occurred in a police encounter to questions about 
how a just and well-functioning society should prevent excessive use of 
police force.”80 Institutionalized video recording programs could help 
vindicate disenfranchised members of society whose claims of police 
abuse have long been met with skepticism, and also vindicate the many 
earnest police officers who are met with hostility among those they seek to 
serve. 
 
 
75.  See, e.g., Developments in the Law—Policing: Considering Police Body Cameras, 128 
HARV. L. REV. 1794, 1802 (2015). 
76.  Mary Calvi, NYPD Paid Nearly $1 Billion to Settle Lawsuits, CBS N.Y. (Oct. 14, 2010), 
https://perma.cc/6KTW-K7M9.  
77.  ARIEL & FARRAR, supra note 69, at 8. For reviews of the existing evidence, see Henstock & 
Ariel, supra note 70; MICHAEL D. WHITE, U.S DEPT. OF JUSTICE, OFF. OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, POLICE 
OFFICER BODY-WORN CAMERAS: ASSESSING THE EVIDENCE 17, 20–22 (2014), available at 
https://perma.cc/ER9F-BCBE. 
78.  See supra note 48 and accompanying text. 
79.  READY & YOUNG, supra note 70, at 445–58.  
80.  See Marc Jonathan Blitz, Police Body-Worn Cameras: Evidentiary Benefits and Privacy 
Threats, AM. CONST. SOC’Y 7 (May 2015), https://perma.cc/J4AP-W32U. See also State v. Henderson, 
27 A.3d 872, 877–78 (N.J. 2011) (“Study after study revealed a troubling lack of reliability in 
eyewitness identifications. From social science research to the review of actual police lineups, from 
laboratory experiments to DNA exonerations, the record proves that the possibility of mistaken 
identification is real. Indeed, it is now widely known that eyewitness misidentification is the leading 
cause of wrongful convictions across the country.”); Jim Dwyer, Witness Accounts in Midtown 
Hammer Attack Show the Power of False Memory, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 2015.  
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II. POLICE CONTROL OF BODY CAMERA PROGRAMS 
Against this great potential, police department ownership and control of 
body camera programs threatens to undermine the very accountability 
promised by these programs. This section will survey how current body 
camera systems work, pointing out along the way the degree to which the 
police control procurement, use, disclosure, and destruction of these 
videos. We will present our proposed alternative in later parts. 
A. Procurement 
Police and law enforcement interests generally play a central role in 
procuring body camera systems. In New York City, for example, a federal 
court ordered the police department to create a body camera pilot program 
precisely to remedy constitutional violations and improve accountability.81 
But the New York City Police Department (NYPD) had sole discretion in 
choosing a vendor.82 
Small police forces similarly have discretion when it comes to 
procurement. For example, small police forces often choose body camera 
systems that favor their interests rather than the public’s interest in holding 
them accountable for their actions. The Sheriff's Office of Stanton County, 
Nebraska, for example, recently acquired body cameras for its ten officers 
last year.83 Their chief expressed what is likely true for many jurisdictions: 
that they bought the system to “protect [them]selves” and “collect video 
evidence.” The selected body camera company, Wolfcom, now uses that 
law enforcement-based rationale to promote its body camera systems to 
other law enforcement agencies.84 
Other body camera vendors also market directly to the police and law 
enforcement interests. The websites for Axon,85 Digital Alley,86 and 
Wolfcom,87 tout features beneficial to police, such as officer protection. 
They tend to avoid emphasizing less police-friendly features, such as 
 
 
81.  Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 668 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
82.  Mark Morales, Taser Questions NYPD’s Body-Camera Contract Award, WALL ST. J., Oct. 
13, 2016. 
83.  Stanton County Sheriff’s Office Chooses WOLFCOM Police Body Cameras, 
WOLFCOMUSA, https://perma.cc/XD8V-YXDN.  
84.  Id. 
85.  Axon Body 2, AXON ("When you need to stay focused, count on Axon Body 2 to record the 
situation at hand . . . . Axon Body 2 has your back."), https://perma.cc/UKL6-8KTR.  
86.  Body Worn Cameras: Most Versatile Body Camera on the Market, DIGITAL ALLY, 
https://perma.cc/WB2N-KBMU ("Each unit comes with a variety of mounts and camera modules that 
help meet your agency's needs."). 
87.  Wolfcom Police Body Cameras, WOLFCOMUSA, https://perma.cc/TS8Q-43CA ("[B]ecause 
‘Cops Deserve The Best’"). 
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enhanced police accountability.  
Wolfcom’s mission appears entirely police-focused, ending with their 
slogan: "because ‘Cops Deserve the Best.’”88 It explains its name by 
reminding us that, “a [w]olf is a natural born leader and survivor . . . . 
When a leader is killed, another takes his place.” Other body camera 
vendors similarly highlight advantages to police and law enforcement, 
such as ease of use and help with authenticating videos for trial. Many 
highlight tools that allow police to view video in the field on their smart 
phones at the moment and make tags.  
Axon takes a more moderate tone but similarly focuses on how its body 
cameras will help officers rather than hold them accountable. They assure 
officers that "Axon Body 2 has your back."89 
These vendors often deemphasize features that might keep police 
officers accountable. They rarely if ever mention how civilians can use 
body camera videos to sue the police, or how the media can use footage to 
demonstrate persistent police abuse. They do not remind police that body 
camera or dash camera videos have led to investigations of police 
shootings in Chicago, Cleveland, and elsewhere. Such facts would make 
for poor marketing when police buy the product; they would make for far 
better marketing if those interested in accountability were the ones 
shopping for a system. 
B. Use and Capture 
Police control how and when body cameras operate and often face few 
sanctions when sidestepping department policies. For example, though 
many systems automatically trigger recording upon certain events, these 
same systems allow the officer discretion whether to activate the recording 
device, and, more important, whether to stop it.90 Officers may, at times, 
need this discretion to avoid recording private matters, such as a domestic 
violence victim’s identity or the interior of a victim’s home.  
 
 
88.  Id. ("Our nations [sic] Law Enforcement officers and first responders risk their lives every 
single day. Despite their honorable sacrifices, their integrity is under constant attack. To protect those 
that protect us all, our mission is to create the best body cameras in the world. A body camera that will 
see and remember what an officer may have forgotten under stressful conditions. A body camera that 
will be the truth behind false accusations when an officer needs it the most, and one that will put the 
viewer right in the shoes of the wearer. We push ourselves to make the best Police body cameras in the 
world because 'Cops Deserve The Best.'" [sic]). 
89.  Axon Body 2, AXON, https://perma.cc/LE9A-HPCV. 
90.  For a review of various policies with regard to officer discretion by jurisdiction, see THE 
LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE ON CIVIL AND HUMAN RIGHTS & UPTURN, supra note 57; BRENNAN 
CENTER FOR JUSTICE, supra note 57. 
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Nevertheless, such power to stop recording has led, in a great many 
cases, to abuse.91 When white officers shot and killed Alton Sterling 
outside a grocery store in Baton Rouge, both officers's body cameras had 
been dislodged.92 Intentionally and unintentionally, officers have been 
found to violate body camera policies at alarming rates, including a 
particularly damning 2014 Department of Justice report about use of force 
in Albuquerque.93 Researchers at the ACLU have cited body camera 
policy compliance rates as low as 30%.94 
When officers fail to record when they should, they often face few, if 
any, consequences.95 In addition, some courts have refused to find that 
police supervisors have any legal obligation to ensure their officers’s 
recording equipment works.96  
D. Access 
Vendors and police configure the access to body camera videos in a 
manner designed to build a case against a suspect, and to prosecute that 
suspect in court, rather than to keep police accountable. For example, in 
some instances police alone have direct access to the videos. This 
configuration runs entirely counter to accountability: the very party that 
the program aims to check currently has full control over its contents.97  
 
 
91.  Barak Ariel et al., The Deterrence Spectrum: Explaining Why Police Body-Worn Cameras 
'Work' or 'Backfire' in Aggressive Police–Public Encounters, POLICING (Jan. 31, 2017), 
https://perma.cc/QC5H-B58Z.  
92.  ACLU Questions Lack of Police Body Cams in Alton Sterling Shooting, CBS/AP (July 6, 
2016), https://perma.cc/T7MQ-ZF9C.  
93.  Letter from Jocelyn Samuels, Acting Asst. Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice & Damon P. 
Martinez, Acting U.S. Att’y, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Richard J. Berry, Mayor, City of Albuquerque 
26 (Apr. 10, 2014), available at https://perma.cc/N86R-6XCB ("We also reviewed numerous reports 
where officers and supervisors on the scene failed to turn on their lapel cameras or belt tapes. Officers 
failed to record some incidents even when it was the officers themselves who initiated the contact, 
making their failure to switch on their cameras or recorders before beginning the encounter especially 
troubling. For example, in an incident where officers fired Tasers at ‘Mike’ after stopping him for 
speeding, none of the officers present recorded the incident. Many of the reports include repetitive or 
standardized explanations for failing to record, such as 'the immediacy of the situation' and 'rapid and 
unexpected event.' These descriptions were provided where it was clear that the officer had a clear 
opportunity to record the event. We found very few examples of officers being reprimanded for failing 
to record force incidents.").  
94.  STANLEY, supra note 51, at 4. 
95.  Connie Fossi-Garcia & Dan Lieberman, Investigation of 5 Cities Finds Body Cameras 
Usually Help Police, FUSION TV (Dec. 7, 2014), https://perma.cc/JQ94-5792. An investigation that 
reviewed records from five police departments concluded that officers “have little to [no] fear when 
violating department policies about recording.” Id. 
96.  See, e.g., Reid v. Womack, No. 2:11–CV–788, 2014 WL 4094465, at *13 (D. Utah Aug. 18, 
2014) (“Furthermore, no supervisor is required or expected to regularly review dash-cams or daily logs 
of all of its officer when there is no known or suspected problem.”). 
97.  See Ashley Southall, Civil Rights Lawyers Plan to Challenge New York’s Body-Camera 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol95/iss2/5
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Similarly, many officers can review videos in the field via a 
smartphone app or otherwise. For example, the Axon system—formerly 
known as “TASER”—provides a mobile app that lets officers “stream, tag, 
and replay video right on your phone.”98 Digital Ally similarly provides a 
mobile app to stream directly from the camera in the field.99 When officers 
use excessive force, or in any controversial case, officers can review any 
footage before filing an incident report stating what they saw and why 
they behaved as they did; such power allows them to ensure that whatever 
account they provide conforms to the video evidence. In numerous cases 
where officers did not have such an opportunity, their own account 
conflicted substantially with the video record.100 
Finally, these systems, and their accompanying policies, drafted by the 
police departments themselves, leave to the discretion of law enforcement 
the question of whether to release video footage to the public or even to 
prosecutors. In Los Angeles, police initially refused to release any video 
footage unless ordered to do so by a court. The Los Angeles Police 
Department (LAPD) eventually stated that it might reconsider that 
policy.101 Notwithstanding, it appears that the LAPD has only released 
footage primarily to support its own officers's narratives in high-profile 
use-of-force incidents to date.102  
The New York Police Department has similarly used its discretion to 
impose rules that disfavor ready release of videos, particularly to criminal 
defendants but also to anyone caught on tape interacting with the police. 
At the same time, it has retained the policy of allowing police to view their 
own videos before filing a report or making a statement. The NYPD has 
maintained this position in the face of strong public and community 
 
 
Program, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 2017 (describing lawsuit to delay program in part because officers can 
view videos before writing their reports).  
98.  Axon Body 2, AXON, https://perma.cc/AB2Y-LDGU.  
99.  DIGITAL ALLY FIRSTVU HD SERIES, FLYER, DIGITAL ALLY, available at 
https://perma.cc/235F-LJ8Y. 
100.   Kevin Conion & Steve Visser, Dashcam Video Appears to Show Fort Worth Cop 
Shooting Man in the Back, CNN (Dec. 30, 2016), http://www.cnn.com/2016/12/30/us/fort-worth-
texas-police-shooting/index.html; Associated Press, Michael Slager’s Account of Walter Scott 
Shooting Contradicted by Video, Officers Say, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Nov. 7, 2016, 3:03 PM), 
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/officer-account-shooting-contradicted-video-cops-article-
1.2862974. 
101.   Miranda S. Spivack, Cop Camera Footage: Public Record or Police Property?, CENTER 
FOR INVESTIGATIVE REP. (Dec. 21, 2016), https://perma.cc/XDL2-XE6X; Kate Mather, A Fight Over 
Access to LAPD Body Cameras is Shaping Up, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2015. 
102.   See, e.g., Kate Mather, James Queally & Joseph Serna, Protests Continue After LAPD 
Releases Video Showing Moments Before Fatal Police Shooting, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2016. Allyson 
Scher & Ariel Spierer, Policing Project to Assist LA: When to Release Body Camera Footage, 
POLICING PROJECT, NYU, https://perma.cc/YDP7-ZTFV.  
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opposition. Indeed, the NYPD itself co-sponsored a survey available to all 
New Yorkers—yielding a response of roughly 25,000 individuals and 
several local organizations.103 This survey, carried out by the Policing 
Project—affiliated with NYU School of Law—very recently revealed a 
public far keener on openness in body camera programs than the police.  
First, 76% of respondents said that the police should be required to 
show a person caught in an interaction with police the video “upon 
request.”104 In response, the NYPD said that it would continue to require 
individuals to pursue public records requests via New York’s Freedom of 
Information Law105—a lengthy process that allows the police to decline to 
produce the videos for numerous reasons in its discretion.106 Second, 
respondents also wanted body-worn camera footage of high-profile 
incidents released to the public either immediately, or after an internal 
investigation is complete.107 The NYPD said it would continue to study the 
problem, but noted numerous instances in which it would not release 
videos in high-profile cases for several months, if at all.108 
Third and most relevant here, the NYPD said that for those depicted in 
videos and subsequently arrested, it would not release the videos to the 
individual at all, even after a public records request. Instead, the video 
would be treated as ordinary criminal discovery109—meaning that the 
individual would likely not receive the video until late in the criminal 
process—as discussed in detail below.  
As for officer access, more than two-thirds of respondents favored 
“some restrictions” on allowing officers to review their own body camera 
videos before writing a report on the incident. Respondents feared officers 
would tailor their reports to the video, and perhaps “explain away their 
conduct.”110 Organizations such as public defenders similarly urged a 
policy requiring police to write reports before viewing the videos. The 
NYPD rejected these views entirely, confirming that officers will be 
 
 
103.   POLICING PROJECT, NYU, REPORT TO THE NYPD SUMMARIZING PUBLIC FEEDBACK ON 
ITS PROPOSED BODY-WORN CAMERA POLICY 6 (2017), available at https://perma.cc/TQD3-LD2T.  
104.   Id. at 25. This includes those who strongly agree or agree with the statement: “If a 
person has an interaction with an officer wearing a body-worn camera, the NYPD should be required 
to show that person the footage upon request.” Id. 
105.   N.Y.C. POLICE DEP’T, NYPD RESPONSE TO PUBLIC AND OFFICER INPUT ON THE 
DEPARTMENT’S PROPOSED BODY-WORN CAMERA POLICY 24 (2017), available at 
https://perma.cc/C5JE-DTSM.  
106.   POLICING PROJECT, supra note 103, at 26. 
107.   N.Y.C. POLICE DEP’T, supra note 105, at 25. 
108.   Id. at 25–26. 
109.   POLICING PROJECT, supra note 103, at 23. 
110.   Id. at 23. 
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permitted to view videos before writing their reports.111  
In sum, police departments—and the vendors they choose—configure 
body camera systems with an eye toward prosecuting civilians rather than 
enhancing their own accountability.  
E. Prosecution 
Finally, this focus on ordinary law enforcement continues once the 
suspect becomes a defendant and the police hand the case over to 
prosecutors. Most systems allow prosecutors to access the videos directly, 
via the vendor’s web portal, or indirectly by way of a DVD that the police 
can supply.112  
Prosecutors therefore may view these videos in drawing up a 
complaint, in arguing at any first appearance or bail hearing, in 
determining a plea offer, and in preparing for trial.  
By contrast, defense lawyers and defendants often do not enjoy access 
to this critical evidence until the eve of trial itself. This asymmetry 
exacerbates the inequities of the criminal justice system when it comes to 
access to information and discovery; it provides such a vivid example of 
our argument that we consider it as a case study of the problem in more 
detail below in 0. It may also help to explain why most prosecutors believe 
that body-worn camera evidence will help the prosecution more than the 
defense.113 
III. BEYOND POLICE CONTROL 
We argue that we must return body camera programs to their chief 
purpose: accountability. Sure, law enforcement may use these videos in 
ordinary prosecutions, but that purpose should remain secondary to police 
accountability and transparency. That dual function requires third-party 
control. Consequently, a neutral, third-party agency should maintain and 
control these videos: a police accountability agency. 
This agency’s main purpose must involve using these videos to deter 
police misconduct, exposing police misconduct when it occurs, 
 
 
111.   Id. at 22.  
112.   The Axon system, for example, includes a platform that will share videos with 
prosecutors via a secure web link. Evidence.com for Prosecutors, AXON, https://perma.cc/6P2K-
3ZAM.  
113.   LINDA MEROLA, supra note 22, at 34. Of the lead prosecutors surveyed, 62.7% believed 
that body camera evidence would assist the prosecution more than the defense. By contrast, 5.8% 
thought that the evidence would be of greater benefit to the defense. Id. 
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sanctioning police for any violations, and developing department-wide 
programs to reduce future violations. These videos would thus not 
primarily serve as evidence against suspects but as evidence in claims 
against the police.  
As discussed above, studies suggest the videos will exonerate a great 
many officers. Indeed, police themselves have embraced body camera 
programs because they often vindicate officer accounts. But we will only 
further this goal of exoneration if we disclose videos evenhandedly. By 
contrast, if the police withhold or selectively disclose videos, the 
community will lose trust in these programs and discount those programs 
and discount those videos that truly show an officer acted appropriately.  
But in many other instances the videos will show wrongdoing by the 
police, allowing this police accountability agency to take appropriate 
steps. These steps should be aimed not necessarily at criminal prosecution 
of officers but rather preventing future violations.  
These videos are evidence useful for other purposes, and this neutral 
agency should develop guidelines—sketched below—for disclosing these 
videos. The emphasis is on neutrality. This agency would disclose the 
videos to those depicted at the same time as law enforcement, and as a 
result, the police and prosecutors would no longer enjoy a privileged 
position. Similarly, the agency would disclose videos to the media when it 
would be in the public interest to do so. At least in high profile cases, this 
public interest would have police accountability as its main criterion. This 
focus on accountability would contrast with current police policies. 
Sometimes departments withhold or selectively disclose to serve law 
enforcement interests. But at other times, law enforcement does so for 
illegitimate reasons, such as portraying victims of excessive police force 
negatively114 or trying to maintain or enhance the reputation of the police 
department or elected officials.  
Below we first sketch the logistics of this independent agency.  
A. Independent Agency 
This police accountability agency would focus on body camera videos 
in the first instance. Though it could operate as an indpendent agency, it 
could also be folded into any larger accountability agency, as long as that 
agency remained genuinely independent of the police and other law 
 
 
114.   The recent release—two and a half years after the fact—of an additional video that casts 
doubt on the Ferguson police portrayal of Michael Brown as an aggressive robber is an excellent 
example of this phenomenon. See Mitch Smith, New Ferguson Video Adds Wrinkle to Michael Brown 
Case, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2017. 
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enforcement. We discuss in more detail below the pros and cons of these 
larger accountability agencies into which our proposed agency might fit.  
Our proposed agency would promote police accountability in numerous 
ways. It would review body camera videos in particular cases where 
misconduct has been alleged. But it would also establish methods for 
reviewing and assessing broad samples of body camera videos so as to 
assess and improve police conduct on the department-level. These two 
tasks would necessarily involve monitoring the police. 
Additionally, the agency would also make the videos accessible to 
others seeking accountability. It would disclose videos to the media, to 
individual plaintiffs seeking redress, and to other watchdogs such as the 
Department of Justice—weighing police accountability against, when 
relevant, individual privacy interests. And, most relevant for these 
purposes, in ordinary criminal cases, it would afford speedy and equal 
access to body camera videos for defense lawyers and prosecutors alike.  
Our proposed agency would satisfy the recent calls of scholars, policy-
makers, advocates, and others to bring police conduct under greater 
democratic control and, more specifically, closer regulatory scrutiny.115 
The police enjoy the greatest power of force and surveillance over the 
American people, and yet are subject to some of the weakest democratic 
checks and regulatory restraints.116 We focus on how police have unilateral 
control over their use of body cameras, but many have noted how they 
enjoy similarly unregulated control over their use of almost every tactic 
and device they employ, including checkpoint stops,117 crackdowns on 
particular types of crime,118 Tasers, SWAT teams, undercover operations, 
drones, recorded interrogations, and so on.119   
Numerous scholars120 and government agencies have urged greater 
 
 
115.   See, e.g., Barry Friedman & Maria Ponomarenko, Democratic Policing, 90 N.Y.U. L. 
Rev. 1827, 1831–35 (2015). 
116.   Id. 
117.   While the Supreme Court has regulated how police may carry out a checkpoint, they 
have imposed few restraints on when and where they may deploy such checkpoints. See, e.g., 
Michigan State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 464 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that under the 
program approved by the majority, “the police have extremely broad discretion in determining the 
exact timing and placement of the roadblock”). 
118.   Mila Sohoni, Crackdowns, 103 VA. L. REV. 31, 36 (2017). 
119.   Friedman & Ponomarenko, supra note 115.  
120.   Id.; Sunita Patel, Democratic Police Reform: A Vision for “Community Engagement” 
Provisions in DOJ Consent Decrees, 51 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 793 (2016) (assessing community 
engagement plans and proposing a blueprint); Simonson, supra note 66 (describing citizens monitoring 
the police through cell phone recording groups); David Sklansky, Police and Democracy, 103 MICH. 
L. REV. 1699, 1703–05 (2005) (supplying a theoretical background). 
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community involvement with policing generally121 and with respect to 
body cameras in particular. For example, the Final Report of the 
President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing called for greater 
community engagement to help remedy distrust of the police.122 The NYU 
School of Law Policing Project seeks to gather community views on 
policing, and otherwise enhance community participation. 
In New York, the police department asked the Policing Project to 
gather community views on the court-ordered pilot body camera program. 
The NYPD committed to respond to the community, outlining how the 
“department adjusted its policy in response to the feedback it received, and 
why.”123 In the end, however, the NYPD chose not to cede control of 
videos or access to them, despite the public’s support for such measures.124 
Our proposed agency should be staffed with neutral officials and 
bureaucrats who will make the day-to-day decisions about the programs, 
the disclosures of video, and so on. But it will also include representatives 
from numerous stakeholders. In addition to the focus on community input 
sketched above,125 the agency will take account of the views of city policy 
makers and executives, including city councils, mayors’ offices, and 
relevant agencies.  
This agency should also include representatives from the police, 
prosecutors’ offices, the defense bar, and judges. The videos will play a 
growing, legitimate role in ordinary law enforcement; police should play a 
significant role in determining how they are procured, configured, and 
used. Lawyers and judges should likewise assist in making these videos 
available and useful at the earliest stages of the criminal process at first 
appearances, bail arguments, arraignments, and before guilty pleas.  
The agency will cost money. Some cost will simply involve shifting the 
existing police funds that pay vendors to maintain the videos to this 
agency; that shift should be revenue-neutral. But the agency will require 
additional funding to implement a more robust, thoughtful, and liberal 
disclosure policy. We anticipate that the same motivation behind pushing 
 
 
121.   See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE CIVIL RIGHTS DIV. & U.S. ATTORNEY’S OFF. N. DIST. 
OF ILL., INVESTIGATION OF THE CHICAGO POLICE DEPARTMENT (Jan. 13, 2017), available at 
https://perma.cc/3RYK-QNMA. 
122.   OFF. OF COMMUNITY ORIENTED POLICING SERVICES, FINAL REPORT OF THE 
PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON 21ST CENTURY POLICING (May 2015), available at 
https://perma.cc/3A9D-N2B3.  
123.   Joe Joseph, NYPD Asks Policing Project to Gather Public Input on Body Cameras, 
POLICING PROJECT (June 29, 2016), https://perma.cc/D7YE-MTBC. The NYPD recently provided its 
response. N.Y.C. POLICE DEP’T, supra note 105. 
124.   See supra notes 103–107 and accompanying text. 
125.   See also Rachel Barkow, Overseeing Agency Enforcement, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1129 
(2016) (outlining how to design an oversight agency). 
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for the program funding in the first place, accountability, can be drawn 
upon to support the funding needed to actually achieve that goal.126  
Outside major cities, however, states should likely create a state-wide 
agency so that each individual municipality need not shoulder the burden 
and cost of setting up such an agency. Such a state-wide approach would 
also set up the body camera programs themselves, so that each 
municipality need not individually source, buy, configure, and maintain 
the equipment and system.  
B. Failures of Existing Police Review Boards 
Many large cities already oversee their police departments with internal 
affairs units or civilian complaint review boards or similar agencies. Many 
commentators and courts127 have criticized these units or agencies as 
failures. Summarizing the prevailing view, one scholar noted that “[police] 
departments’ resistance to disciplining their own officers extends to even 
the most obvious misconduct.”128  
These existing oversight agencies have failed for many reasons, 
including small staffs and budgets, lack of enforcement power, and, in 
some cases, bias toward the very police departments they oversee. They 
often lack subpoena power, investigative resources, and the power to 
criminally charge or sanction police officers.129  
The Department of Justice recently reviewed Chicago’s police 
accountability bodies and found them deficient.130 The DOJ also made 
similar findings in Baltimore.131 These accountability agencies rarely 
sustained complaints, often failed even to investigate cases, conducted 
cursory investigations, were stymied by police codes of silence, and had 
inadequate staffing.132 Both cities agreed to federal oversight of their 
police departments, and both have begun to revamp their accountability 
agencies. Chicago, for example, created a new Civilian Office of Police 
 
 
126.   Chicago has committed funds for a new Civilian Office of Police Accountability with 
enhanced staffing and resources. Dan Hinkel & Jeremy Gorner, Chicago Police Vow to Continue 
Reforms but Few Details Offered, CHIC. TRIB., Mar. 14, 2017. 
127.   See, e.g., Beck v. City of Pittsburgh, 89 F.3d 966, 974 (3d Cir. 1996). 
128.   Rachel Moran, Ending the Internal Affairs Farce, 64 BUFF. L. REV. 837, 866 (2016). 
129.   Kate Levine, Who Shouldn’t Prosecute the Police, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1447, 1494 (2016).  
130.   See generally U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., supra note 121.  
131.   U.S DEP’T OF JUSTICE CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., INVESTIGATION OF THE BALTIMORE CITY 
POLICE DEPARTMENT 140 (Aug. 10, 2016), available at https://perma.cc/76MR-2H76. 
132.   Id. See also POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY TASK FORCE, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REFORM: 
RESTORING TRUST BETWEEN THE CHICAGO POLICE AND THE COMMUNITIES THEY SERVE 15 (2016), 
available at https://perma.cc/B9TD-W5NB (“Chicago’s police accountability system is broken.”). 
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Accountability to replace IPRA.  
A reader might wonder what makes us believe our proposed 
independent police accountability agency would fare any better. We 
suggest that our proposed police accountability agency might succeed 
where previous efforts have often failed because it will have a concrete 
role in controlling police videos, and this role will afford it greater ability 
to oversee police departments. In addition, this agency will hopefully 
enjoy the greater funding that many governments have willingly afforded 
to new body camera programs. In short, now is the time for new 
accountability agencies to ride the popular wave of body cameras in order 
to achieve a more trusting relationship between police and the 
communities they serve. And as cities such as Chicago begin to create and 
fund truly independent bodies, our proposal could dovetail nicely with 
those ongoing efforts. 
Unfortunately, neither Chicago nor Baltimore’s proposals for an 
independent accountability agency to review complaints against the police 
includes what we urge: that such an agency control police body camera 
videos.133 Without that independent control, even these proposed new 
independent oversight agencies will lack control over the central new tool 
of police accountability: body camera videos.  
C. Servers 
Police face high costs and technical challenges storing videos on in-
house servers;134 some departments have chosen to store their videos with 
the camera vendors, which afford police and prosecutors remote access. 
These vendors are developing expertise in housing, indexing, and 
protecting these videos. Nevertheless, even third-party vendors come with 
potential drawbacks since they develop surveillance tools such as facial 
recognition software135 without democratic control or authorization.  
Our proposal would not necessarily change the existing physical 
control of videos by third-party commercial vendors or even police 
departments; it would simply shift from the police to the police 
accountability agency complete control over the videos, developing rules 
 
 
133.   United States v. Police Dep’t of Baltimore, No. 1:17-cv-00099-JKB (D. Md. 2017); U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., supra note 121. 
134.   POLICE EXEC. RESEARCH FORUM, IMPLEMENTING A BODY-WORN CAMERA PROGRAM 
27 (2014), available at https://perma.cc/U5HT-9YP8 (claiming that of forty departments consulted, all 
stored either in-house or on a cloud service managed by a third-party vendor); Josh Sanburn, Storing 
Body Cam Data is the Next Big Challenge for Police, TIME, Jan. 26, 2016. 
135.   Matt Stroud, Taser Plans to Livestream Police Body Camera Footage to the Cloud by 
2017, MOTHERBOARD (Jul. 18, 2016), https://perma.cc/GVL2-M4NF.  
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for their maintenance, disclosure, and deletion, and effectuating those rules 
by actually deciding who gets what when.  
Nevertheless, our proposal to remove control over videos from police 
departments makes it easier to shift, conceptually, to the notion that tens of 
thousands of police departments across the country, big and small, should 
not be attempting to develop and safely maintain massive amounts of 
video data. In the long run, expert commercial cloud vendors should likely 
maintain these videos both because they are likely to better guard against 
hacking and because they can probably maintain and index the material 
better and more cost effectively. 
D. Procurement Decisions 
Similarly, the police accountability agency will lead procurement. Law 
enforcement should certainly play a role in deciding which systems to 
adopt; they will, after all, be using them. In addition, civilian agencies 
such as state legislatures, city councils, attorney generals; offices, the 
comptrollers’ offices, civilian complaint review boards, criminal defense 
offices, and inspector generals’ offices should also play a role in the 
process, including giving input on which systems to procure and how to 
configure them, with an eye toward goals beyond simply aiding law 
enforcement. These other agencies, some of which both defend and 
prosecute police misconduct, will be a necessary voice in shaping a 
program that furthers accountability. 
E. Configuration and Use 
The police accountability agency will likewise configure the body 
cameras and systems to ensure accountability. Police often fail to activate 
recordings, stop them, or block the view, often in violation of their own 
departments’ policies. The police accountability agency could require 
more forensic metadata to allow experts to determine whether the camera 
failed or the officer deliberately interfered with its proper functioning. The 
agency could require continuous recording while on duty, longer buffering 
periods (like a DVR, the camera always records but only saves the last 30 
or 60 seconds upon activation), or real-time upload (especially as mobile 
connections become faster). 
The police accountability agency could be empowered to impose 
sanctions on individual officers, supervisors, or entire departments for 
violations of any recording rules. Today, as already noted, officers rarely 
suffer discipline for recording violations.  
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IV. SYMMETRICAL ACCESS 
This Part illustrates one of the biggest practical changes brought about 
by our proposal— access in the context of ordinary criminal cases.  
Currently, police and prosecutors control body camera video, and 
defense counsel must seek those videos by subpoena136 or other discovery 
device, and can expect to wait to receive them—sometimes until trial.137 
This asymmetry puts defense counsel at a disadvantage, whether preparing 
for trial or advising a client to consider a plea. Similarly, defendants 
themselves must approach a plea offer without potentially critical 
information concerning the case.  
We have argued in general for removing from the police both the 
physical and legal control over body camera videos in favor of a police 
accountability agency. The chief corollary of our proposal relates to 
defense discovery: under our proposal, defense counsel will have near-
symmetrical access to such video as prosecutors.  
Indeed, these videos will no longer be produced in discovery at all. 
This is fitting, since body cameras have been championed and funded as 
tools to enhance police accountability and not merely as ordinary law 
enforcement tools. In our proposed system, prosecutors and defense 
counsel alike will seek the videos from the police accountability agency 
just as each would have to seek, for example, cell phone video from a 
civilian. True, the Agency will establish automatic access for each side as 
detailed below; but prosecutors, police, and other law enforcement will not 
have presumptively superior claims to these materials. 
Our proposal fits into the larger debate concerning defense discovery, 
and the unfair asymmetry between defense and prosecution—whether 
before plea or even during trial. This section will briefly survey that debate 
in general. It will then sketch how defense counsel should be afforded 
access to the videos before turning to reasons to support such early, timely 
access. 
This section will provide reasons rooted in policy, fairness, accuracy, 
and efficiency for providing defendants and their counsel timely access to 
body camera videos. We will therefore present our argument below 
focusing on misdemeanor and simple felony cases. These cases are the 
 
 
136.   See WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 20.3(a) (4th ed. 2016) (noting 
most jurisdictions do not require prosecutors to produce anything not in their possession or control). 
137.   Housley v. Tanner, No. 09-4358, 2010 WL 4924776, at *6 (E.D. La. 2010) (defense 
counsel first saw incriminating undercover police body camera video at trial). 
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most likely to involve body camera video, whether documenting the 
charged crime itself such as resisting arrest or, in the case of a possession 
charge, supplying evidence concerning reasonable suspicion or probable 
cause for a stop or search. Misdemeanors themselves make up about 80% 
of criminal cases, involving roughly 10.5 million per year.138 These cases 
almost always conclude with a plea, often at first appearance, and present 
the highest risk of innocent defendants pleading guilty.139 This results from 
the desire to bring an end to what could be a long and torturous process, 
especially in cases where the offered penalty appears light compared to 
what the individual would face under most sentencing schemes.140 
Admittedly, in some ways, by making body camera videos more 
accessible to defense counsel, and automatically available to both sides, 
we inject these videos even deeper into ordinary criminal cases, running at 
cross purposes with our premise: that the chief purpose of these videos lies 
in police accountability and not ordinary law enforcement cases. 
Nevertheless, as discussed more above, law enforcement has already 
retooled these videos from methods of accountability to methods of 
prosecution, and that development will be almost impossible to reverse. 
Plus, it is hard to justify categorically excluding a class of relevant 
evidence from prosecutors or defense counsel.  
There is no reason that body cameras cannot serve both goals—
accountability and law enforcement—simultaneously acting effectively as 
truth-seekers. In order for this to succeed, we argue that, at the very least, 
there should be a fair symmetry in their use; again, if body cameras chief 
purpose is police accountability, then when they are used for their 
secondary purpose (law enforcement) in ordinary criminal cases, they 
should not be treated as within the sole and unilateral dominion of the 
police and prosecutors. Even if these purposes are regarded as equal, 
symmetrical access would be crucial for body cameras to fulfill both. 
A. Defense Discovery 
In civil lawsuits, federal and state law affords liberal discovery; each 
side enjoys symmetrical access to information from the other side before 
trial,141 including all non-privileged, relevant documents,142 the right to 
 
 
138.   Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanors, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1313, 1320 (2012). 
139.   Id. at 1345. 
140.   Nancy Gertner, Bruce Brower & Paul Shechtman, Letters to the Editor, ‘Why the 
Innocent Plead Guilty’: An Exchange, THE N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS (Jan. 8, 2015), 
https://perma.cc/GV98-7CQ4. 
141.   FED. R. CIV. P. 26. 
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conduct depositions of witnesses,143 broad subpoena power of witnesses,144 
and other discovery devices.  
By contrast, defendants in criminal cases have traditionally enjoyed 
almost no right to pre-trial discovery. They have had little right to access 
police reports, witness statements, depositions, prior testimony from grand 
jury proceedings, or other ordinary tools available on the civil side.145 In 
the federal system and in many state systems, defendants do not have a 
right to view previous statements by the witnesses against them until those 
witnesses have testified.146  
Those opposing defense discovery have relied on a few main 
rationales: first, they worry defendants will use the information to craft 
their testimony and commit perjury, or to persuade other witnesses to do 
so.147 Second, they worry defendants will learn from the discovery the 
identity of witnesses or their likely testimony, and intimidate (or harm) 
those witnesses.148 Third, they believe that it would be unfair to the 
prosecutors since the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination 
would not impose on the defendant a reciprocal duty to disclose his 
case.149 
Despite these objections, many jurisdictions have recently liberalized 
their discovery rules in recognition of the unfair position in which they 
place criminal defendants. Florida allows defendants to depose witnesses 
before trial. Texas recently enacted a broad defense discovery act.150 
Despite these advances, the federal discovery rules remain very limited, as 
do those of most states. In all jurisdictions, the information flows to the 
prosecutor first and then, at some point in the process, to defense, but 
often only for those 6% of defendants who choose to forego plea deals in 
 
 
142.   FED R. CIV. P. 34. 
143.   FED. R. CIV. P. 30. 
144.   FED. R. CIV. P. 45.  
145.   Ben Grunwald, The Fragile Promise of Open-File Discovery, 49 CONN. L. REV. 771, 
773 (2017) (“[D]efendants are entitled to little prosecutorial evidence.”); Jean Montoya, A Theory of 
Compulsory Process Clause Discovery Rights, 70 IND. L.J. 845, 845 (1995) (“Anyone who has 
practiced or studied both civil and criminal litigation in the United States is immediately struck by the 
relative lack of discovery devices available to the defendant in a criminal prosecution.”); William J. 
Brennan, Jr., The Criminal Prosecution: Sporting Event or Quest for Truth?, WASH. U. L. Q. 1963, 
279, 288–90; LAFAVE, supra note 136, at § 20.1(b).  
146.   18 U.S.C. § 3500 (2015). 
147.   Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Worst Surprise of All: No Right to Pretrial Discovery of 
the Prosecution’s Uncharged Misconduct Evidence, 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 247, 264 (1987); Brennan, 
supra note 145, at 289–92 (noting and rejecting argument). 
148.   Imwinkelried, supra note 147, at 269–73. He notes that the problem of witness 
intimidation is small but sufficiently possible in some cases to warrant courts to craft particularized 
limits to discovery. 
149.   LAFAVE, supra note 136, at § 20.1(b). 
150.   TEX. CODE OF CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 39.14 (West 2014).  
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favor of trials. Often, the decision of when in the process to hand over 
discovery is almost entirely in the discretion of the individual prosecutor 
on the case. Judges do not control this process. 
Moreover, discovery in misdemeanor cases at the first appearance, in 
time for a plea, remains virtually nonexistent.151  
As detailed below, our proposal to make body camera videos available 
to defense counsel at the first appearance, in time to shed light on plea 
negotiations as well as bail arguments, will largely sidestep many of the 
objections normally leveled against affording the defense early discovery. 
Before turning to those reasons, however, we first sketch the typical 
procedure leading up to the first appearance in a misdemeanor case. 
B. Processing a Criminal Case 
In a typical misdemeanor or simple felony case, the police who have 
arrested a suspect forward information to prosecutors, sometimes in the 
form of an affidavit or police report. In large metropolitan areas, 
prosecutors often staff complaint rooms,152 where they write criminal 
complaints setting forth the criminal statute charged and the facts showing 
the defendant violated that statute.153 Prosecutors will rely on the written 
information supplied, but they will often speak directly with the arresting 
officer by phone, video, or in person.154  
Prosecutors file the charging documents with the court clerk, who 
dockets a case, transforming the suspect into a defendant. Meanwhile, the 
police transport the defendant to central booking at the courthouse where 
clerks book him. The court system will usually hold the defendant in a 
courthouse holding cell, which can contain hundreds of other defendants 
in large cities, pending their appearance before a judge.155  
In those jurisdictions that appoint counsel for indigent defendants at 
their first appearance, that defense counsel will often receive the criminal 
complaint for a defendant and be afforded time to speak with the 
defendant immediately before appearing before the judge.156 During this 
 
 
151.   Grunwald, supra note 145, at 773 (“[D]efendants…must negotiate plea agreements and 
prepare for trial in the dark.”). 
152.   New York City describes these as complaint rooms. Other jurisdictions use other terms.  
153.   People ex rel. Maxian v. Brown, 77 N.Y.2d 422, 425 (1991) (describing process in New 
York City); Williams v. Ward, 845 F.2d 374, 376–78 (2d Cir. 1988); People v. LaFontaine, 619 
N.Y.S.2d 479, 480–81 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1994). 
154.   Ward, 845 F.2d at 377. 
155.   Brown, 77 N.Y.2d at 425; Ward, 845 F.2d at 374. 
156.   Brown, 77 N.Y.2d at 425. 
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initial interview, the defense lawyer will explain the charges and get basic 
information from the defendant.157 Counsel will often focus on getting 
enough facts to make a persuasive argument that the defendant should be 
released pending trial.158  
Counsel will also try to determine whether the defendant should 
consider pleading guilty now, at first appearance. This decision will 
depend upon factors including the strength of the government case, the 
defendant’s willingness to plead guilty, the defendant’s previous criminal 
record, and the likelihood of a defendant being held on high bail.159  
Once defense counsel has met with her client, court officers will bring 
the defendant before the judge. The prosecutor and defense counsel will 
also be present. At this first appearance, the magistrate must find probable 
cause to believe the defendant committed the offense or release the 
defendant.160 Most states’ criminal procedure rules also require magistrates 
or judges, during this first appearance, to determine bail, orders of 
protection, and other conditions under which to release the defendant 
pending trial.161  
In assessing probable cause and bail, the court will hear from both 
sides. The prosecutor will present the charges and often recommend a bail 
amount. The defense will then argue for release, and sometimes argue that 
the prosecution has not established probable cause. Many jurisdictions 
appoint counsel to represent indigent defendants at this first appearance;162 
in other jurisdictions, defendants are on their own.163 
Finally, prosecutors or judges will at times offer defendants a plea 
agreement to dispose of the case then and there. These pleas are often 
quite attractive to defendants because they might result in immediate 
release, or release in a few days.164 Defendants, especially those facing 
 
 
157.   AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE DEFENSE 
FUNCTION, Standard 4–3.2 (4th ed. 2015). 
158.   Id. 
159.   Id. 
160.   Id. 
161.   18 U.S.C. § 3142 (2012); Rothgery v. Gillespie Cty., 554 U.S. 191, 196 (2008) 
(describing Texas’ procedure); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-64a (West 2014); FLA. R. CRIM. P. 
3.131. 
162.   Maxian v. Brown, 77 N.Y.2d 422, 425 (1991). 
163.   Lahny R. Silva, Right to Counsel and Plea Bargaining: Gideon’s Legacy Continues, 99 
IOWA L. REV. 2219, 2232 (2014) (“From misdemeanors to felonies, judges conduct hearings and take 
pleas without defendants ever consulting with or being represented by a lawyer.”); Stephen B. Bright 
& Sia M. Sanneh, Fifty Years of Defiance and Resistance after Gideon v. Wainwright, 122 YALE L. J. 
2150, 2152 (2013) (poor people regularly appear before judges at hearings without lawyers and many 
“plead guilty without lawyers”).  
164.   Josh Bowers, Punishing the Innocent, 156 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1117, 1133 (2008); Silva, 
supra note 163, at 2232; Bright & Sanneh, supra note 163, at 2152 (“Innocent people plead guilty to 
get out of jail.”); Allison D. Redlich & Alicia Summers, Voluntary, Knowing, and Intelligent Pleas: 
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misdemeanor charges, who decline to plead guilty can wait weeks or 
months in jail for trial on charges that often result in sentences of only a 
few days or weeks.165  
As for discovery, defendants will almost never receive any discovery 
from the prosecution during this first appearance. They will not receive 
police reports, 911 calls, radio runs, witness statements, their own 
statements to the police, a list of physical evidence, lab tests, video tapes, 
photographs, lineup identification information, or anything else. Usually, 
they simply receive the charging document such as a criminal complaint 
stating the statute and a bare recitation of facts alleged.166  
Nevertheless, defendants often plead guilty ignorant of anything but the 
very rudiments of the state’s case because they want to get out of jail more 
quickly.167 
1. Body Camera Discovery 
There are currently no jurisdictions of which we are aware have moved 
police body cameras outside discovery, with its inherent asymmpetry, to 
provide them immediately to defendants. As with other discovery, 
defendants and their counsel have no access to body camera videos at first 
appearance or before a plea agreement, even when that evidence could be 
useful or dispositive.168 Among the body camera policies that have been 
made public, most police share footage with prosecutors only, and make 
no mention of criminal defendants. Those jurisdictions which do mention 
criminal defendants169 only refer to them in order to clarify that defense 
attorneys must procure video footage from prosecutors in accordance with 
existing discovery rules.170 No jurisdiction places ownership of the footage 
 
 
Understanding the Plea Inquiry, 18 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL’Y & L. 626, 628 (defendants “may be quite 
pleased” with a plea that allows them to avoid jail). 
165.   Bowers, supra note 164, at 1133; Jed S. Rakoff, Why Innocent People Plead Guilty, THE 
NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS (Nov. 20, 2014), https://perma.cc/CB6S-56DM. 
166.   Bright & Sanneh, supra note 163, at 2157 (“Some prosecutors make plea offers 
conditioned upon the defendant's not filing any motions or seeking discovery.”). 
167.   Id.; Silva, supra note 163, at 2232. 
168.   For an illustration of how this denial of access can negatively impact bail decisions, see 
Zina Makar, Op-Ed, Bail Reform Begins with the Bench, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 2016.  
169.   See, e.g., CHARLOTTE-MECKLENBURG POLICE DEP’T, INTERACTIVE DETECTIVES’ 
GUIDE, § 400–06 (June 8, 2016), https://perma.cc/9TK8-8RR3; FAYETTEVILLE POLICE DEPARTMENT 
WRITTEN DETECTIVES AND OPERATING PROCEDURES, § 3.24 (Feb. 25, 2015), available at 
https://perma .cc/4SRM-XUWJ; ROCHESTER POLICE DEPARTMENT BODY-WORN CAMERA MANUAL 
(June 15, 2016), available at https://perma.cc/45HN-9NE7; SAN ANTONIO POLICE DEPARTMENT 
GENERAL MANUAL, PROCEDURE 410–BODY WORN CAMERAS (Feb. 12, 2016), available at 
https://perma. cc/9NMX-5PNB. 
170.   N.Y.C. POLICE DEP’T, supra note 105, at 24. 
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in the hands of a neutral third party, and none gives direct access to 
criminal defendants or their attorneys.171 
C. Timely Defense Access 
We propose a straightforward solution that follows naturally from our 
larger proposal that an independent police accountability agency maintain 
body camera videos: defense counsel or defendants should have access to 
relevant body camera videos before the first appearance. We sketch here 
the logistics of this access before devoting the remainder of this section to 
supporting the proposal. 
First, upload: in most cases the police will upload videos from the field 
or immediately upon ending their shift. In those cases in which they have 
not, police must upload body camera video early in the arrest and booking 
process and certainly in time for prosecutors and defense counsel to view 
before first appearance. They would upload the video with appropriate 
identifying tags such as the defendant’s name and any state identification 
number used as part of booking or from his previous criminal record.  
Second, we propose that both prosecutors and defense counsel have 
immediate access to these videos via a secure Internet connection or, more 
likely, a secure smartphone or tablet app. The security will follow federal 
and state guidelines for handling electronic data172 and ensure that the 
prosecutor or defense counsel has authorization to view the video. 
Prosecutors or defense counsel would have to log in to the site, provide 
their own password, and enter a passkey for the particular case they seek 
to access. Probably the court system would provide dedicated computers 
or tablets for the lawyers and the judge to access these videos. Limiting 
access to recognized dedicated computers (along with passwords) will 
enhance security.  
The FBI Criminal Justice Information Services has issued detailed 
guidelines for maintaining the secure collection, retention, and 
transmission of sensitive criminal justice information. Its 2015 Security 
Policy comprehensively describes guidelines for secure, authenticated 
computer login procedures limited to authorized personnel. It includes 
 
 
171.   See THE LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE ON CIVIL AND HUMAN RIGHTS & UPTURN, supra 
note 57. 
172.   FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATIONS CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFO. SERV. DIV., FBI CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE INFORMATION SERVICES (CJIS) SECURITY POLICY (2015); see also National Institute of 
Standards and Technology, Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity (Feb. 12, 
2014), https://perma.cc/SU5Z-SXJV; Sci. Working Grp. on Dig. Evidence & International Org. on 
Dig. Evidence, Digital Evidence: Standards and Principles, FORENSIC SCI. COMMC’N, April 2000 
(these guidelines largely govern how agencies should maintain digital evidence). 
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appendices governing local police departments.173  
Prosecutors and defense counsel will likely stream the video rather than 
download it. The plug-in allowing the stream, such as QuickTime, or the 
applet, such as Flash, would discard the data as it streams it. The parties 
can stream the video as often as necessary, but the police accountability 
agency will bar them from downloads to avoid improper distribution.  
Courts will need a fast Internet connection to allow relatively high 
quality streaming, though any system will compress the files in ways that 
lose some information and quality. This compression may already have 
occurred when the police upload and store the original videos to the cloud, 
or even when they record the videos in the first place. Depending on the 
technology, the parties may first wish to view the video at a lower quality 
merely to see if anything warrants further, higher quality viewing. 
As for timing, prosecutors will have access to the videos in the 
complaint room. As they draw up the criminal complaint or other charging 
document, they will be able to view the videotape to assess the charges 
themselves or any other potential procedural issues, such as an illegal 
search, a suggestive identification at the scene, or other infirmities. This 
will allow prosecutors to dismiss cases early, or recommend more lenient 
plea agreements. 
Defense counsel will have access in the courtroom before they appear 
before the judge with their client to be heard on bail and other matters. 
They may wish to view the tape before or after seeing their client. Ideally, 
they will be able to view the video with their client, who can explain what 
is going on. This will help the defense also evaluate the strength of the 
prosecution's case, discover any problems with their potential case, and to 
identify witnesses to interview in preparing for trial.  
D. An Argument for Timely Access 
1. Exculpatory Evidence 
Most important, body camera video will sometimes show that the 
defendant is innocent of the charge.174 It may show the defendant did not 
resist arrest, or attack the officer, or that the defendant was acting in self-
defense against excessive force.175 In drug cases, the video may show that 
 
 
173.   FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATIONS CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFO. SERV. DIV., supra note 172. 
174.   United States v. Zaragoza-Moreira, 780 F.3d 971, 974 (9th Cir. 2015) (federal agents 
allowed potentially exculpatory video to be destroyed; court reversed conviction).  
175.   Burton v. State, 978 N.E. 2d 520, 526–27 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (reversing trial court’s 
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the defendant did not possess drugs, that the stash of drugs was not really 
anywhere near him, or that other criteria for constructive possession were 
otherwise not met.176  
Recent events in Baltimore illustrate the critical role defense counsel 
can and should play in reviewing police body camera videos in addition to 
prosecutors. In July 2017, Maryland’s Office of the Public Defender 
released a body camera video that appears to show a Baltimore police 
officer planting drugs, prompting prosecutors to dismiss dozens of cases 
involving the officer depicted in the video.177 The public defender’s office 
said at least one other video, from November 2016, shows police 
manufacturing evidence.178 Note that both prosecutors and the police in 
Baltimore have units devoted to reviewing such body camera footage, and 
neither caught these videos.179 
In drunk driving cases, the video may show that the defendant was not 
driving in a drunken manner, or perhaps not driving at all.180 It might show 
her passing the field sobriety tasks. In fact, several jurisdictions require 
that police videotape field sobriety tests, and their failure to produce the 
video in court can result in a dismissal or an adverse inference.181  
As Alexandra Natapoff has written, states process roughly 10.5 million 
non-traffic misdemeanor cases per year; these cases make up 80% of 
criminal court dockets.182 Many of these fall into categories to which video 
tape evidence might be relevant. She writes that many of these 
misdemeanor convictions are for “urban disorder offenses,” such as 
disorderly conduct,183 drunk driving, drug possession,184 minor assault, 
vandalism,185 drunkenness, vagrancy,186 and curfew violation or 
 
 
failure to allow self-defense instruction in light of dash camera video showing officers apparently 
attacking the defendant and using excessive force). 
176.   Jack Leonard, Surprise Video Puts an End to Drug Trial, L.A. TIMES (July 1, 2008), 
http://articles.latimes.com/2008/jul/01/local/me-video1 (video showed defendant did not throw box 
with drugs during chase as alleged). 
177.   Jacey Fortin, Video Appears to Show Baltimore Police Offcer Planting Drugs, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 19, 2017. 
178.   Jacey Fortin, Baltimore Drops Dozens of Cases After Video Casts Doubt on Officers, 
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2017) at A10. 
179.   Eric Westervelt, New Baltimore Police Scandal Threatens Criminal Cases, ALL THINGS 
CONSIDERED, NPR Aug. 8, 2017. 
180.   State v. Merriman, 410 S.W.3d 779, 782 (Tenn. 2015) (dismissing drunk driving 
conviction because police failed to preserve video of traffic stop that could have shown defendant had 
not been driving in a drunken or reckless manner). 
181.   See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-5-2953 (2009). 
182.   Natapoff, supra note 138, at 1320. 
183.   Id. at 1316. She estimates 665,000 disorderly conduct cases per year. 
184.   Id. She estimates 758,000 marijuana possession cases per year.  
185.   Id. She estimates 270,000 vandalism cases per year. 
186.   Id.  She estimates 33,000 vagrancy cases per year. 
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loitering.187 These are often the precise cases that body cameras might 
document, especially with the buffer capability that captures footage from 
before the officer hits the record button. 
Charges of curfew violation, loitering, and vagrancy often depend on 
particular facts that an officer sees, and can easily result from an abuse of 
police discretion, often as retaliation for what the officer perceives to be 
rude behavior from a civilian.188 Body camera videos will deter police 
from engaging in such abusive behavior and help limit arrests to those of 
individuals who genuinely pose a threat.  
Cities often have specific targeted programs to arrest individuals for 
trespassing in public housing, or even private housing, and here too body 
camera videos can shed light on whether the defendant was properly 
stopped and questioned and whether he had authority to be there.189 
In the end, Natapoff estimates that thousands of innocent defendants 
plead guilty to misdemeanors each year, often simply to get out of jail 
more quickly.190 For many of these defendants, body camera videos will 
either show their innocence, which would result in a dismissal, or would at 
least tend to exonerate the individual, which may encourage a defendant to 
stick it out to trial. 
2. Fourth Amendment and other Violations 
Body cameras will also supply evidence of possible police violations191 
of the Fourth Amendment or other provisions, such as a violation of 
Miranda. They will often show whether police had reasonable suspicion to 
stop a person for questioning,192 or to believe he is armed, justifying a 
search; they will show whether a person consented to a search free of 
coercion;193 they will show whether police properly executed a search 
 
 
187.   Id. She estimates 112,000 curfew violation or loitering cases per year.  
188.   McCurdy v. Montgomery County, Ohio, 240 F.3d 512, 520 (6th Cir. 2001). 
189.   Ligon v. City of New York, 925 F.Supp.2d 478, 484–85 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (holding New 
York City’s “Trespass Affidavit Program” regularly violated the Fourth Amendment) . 
190.   See id.; see also Silva, supra note 163; Bright & Sanneh, supra note 163. 
191.   State v. Collins, 87 So. 3d 857, 859 (La. Ct. App. 2010) (suppressing evidence and 
reserving conviction since police video showed the defendant did not change lanes without signaling, 
rendering the stop unlawful); United States v. Jackson, No. EP-10-CR-1628-KC, 2010 WL 4023553, 
at *8–10 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 13, 2010) (suppressing evidence after video showed officer detaining 
motorist solely because of his refusal to consent to search). 
192.   State v. Stowe, 25 So. 3d 945, 951 (La. Ct. App. 2009) (dash camera established 
reasonable suspicion to continue detention of motorist); Albani v. United States, No. 09-4790, WL 
2010 WL 4181816, at *8 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 25, 2010) (video established probable cause by showing 
security officer taking steps to steal wallet). 
193.   Caraway v. State, 255 S.W.3d 302, 310 (Tex. Ct. App. 2008) (police video showed 
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warrant or if there was some exigency justifying an exception to the 
warrant requirement.194 Did they knock and announce before entering? 
Did they exceed the scope of the warrant? Did they use excessive force in 
making an arrest?195  
Often, the absence of certain material on body camera videos will 
reveal violations. If the police claim a person consented to a search but 
they failed to record that consent, the absence may be evidence the person 
did not consent. If the police claim the defendant resisted arrest but the 
body camera was off at the time, the court might be entitled to infer the 
individual did not resist, assuming the defendant so claims.  
These videos will not only show police violations, but, at other times, 
will also support the police in showing that they did have probable cause, 
reasonable suspicion, or consent. These videos will therefore facilitate and 
expedite suppression hearings by simply showing what happened.  
One important category we must discuss involves stop-and-frisk, and 
whether the police have reasonable suspicion under Terry in a particular 
case to stop and detain a person for questioning. In Floyd v. City of New 
York, the court found that the NYPD regularly violated the Fourth 
Amendment rights of suspects as part of its vast stop and frisk program.196 
Between 2004 and 2012, the police conducted roughly 4.4 million stops 
and frisks—searches and seizures under the Fourth Amendment. The court 
found that the officers often lacked reasonable suspicion to effect these 
stops—and this finding was based on forms the police officers themselves 
were required to fill out.197  
The court in Floyd therefore ordered the police to adopt a pilot body 
camera program to help guard against these Fourth Amendment 
violations.198 In particular, the court found that body cameras are 
“uniquely suited to addressing the constitutional harms at issue in this 
case.”199 These cameras were to accomplish this goal by allowing police 
supervisors to monitor the recordings, preserve them to verify complaints 
against the police, and evaluate the effectiveness of the body cameras. The 
 
 
defendant’s physical conduct amounted to voluntary consent to search of vehicle); State v. Prater, 984 
N.E.2d 36, 39–40 (Ohio Ct. App. 2012). 
194.   Meeks v. City of Minneapolis, 822 F. Supp. 2d 919, 924 (D. Minn. 2011) (video showed 
no exigency justifying strip search in public). 
195.   Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007) (police video showing high speed chase 
demonstrated that the police acted reasonably in seizing the fleeing defendant and therefore did not 
violate his Fourth Amendment rights). 
196.   959 F. Supp. 2d 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
197.   Id. 
198.   Id. at 685. 
199.   Id. 
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court appointed a monitor to ensure compliance.200 
On the other hand, body camera videos will also show instances when 
officers did not violate the Fourth Amendment. When the police seek 
consent for a search, individuals will often give consent with little 
apparent coercion.201 Viewpoint bias may make the consent appear more 
voluntary than it is, but body cameras will at least identify the most clearly 
coercive situations.  
Some might argue that if a person is guilty, it does not matter that his 
Fourth Amendment rights were violated. Or at least, it might matter at a 
hearing or a trial, but shouldn’t at the plea bargain stage. Some courts have 
at least suggested Brady202 applies to the plea bargaining process203 and 
suppression motions204 under the Fourth Amendment.  
Body camera videos may also illustrate other constitutional violations, 
such as faulty identification proceedings. Police may have created an 
undue risk of suggestiveness by bringing a suspect directly to a victim for 
identification on site.205 They may also have tainted an identification by 
giving the victim hints as to which member of a six-person line-up they 
hope she chooses.206 Absent body camera videos, such interactions 
between police and victims during crucial stages of a case would 
otherwise likely go unchecked by defendants and their attorneys. 
3. Plea Bargaining 
Over all, 97% of federal cases and 94% of state cases end in guilty 
pleas.207 As noted above, an even larger percentage of misdemeanor cases 
end in a guilty plea, and the vast majority of defendants enter this plea 
without ever seeing the evidence against them.  
Scholars have argued that this state of ignorance renders the pleas 
 
 
200.   Id. 
201.   See, e.g., United States v. Sapp, No. 2:15-CR-00221-KJD-NJK, 2016 WL 155028 (D. 
Nev. Jan. 13, 2016).  
202.   Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (holding due process requires prosecutors to 
provide defense counsel material exculpatory material).  
203.   United States v. Dahl, 597 Fed.Appx. 489, 490 (10th Cir. 2015). 
204.   Biles v. United States, 101 A.3d 1012, 1015 (D.C. Ct. App. 2014) (citing Miller v. 
United States, 14 A.3d 1094 (D.C. 2011), Mackabee v. United States, 29 A.3d 952 (D.C. 2011), and 
collecting cases from other jurisdictions). 
205.   United States v. Sapp, No. 2:15-CR-00221-KJD-NJK, 2016 WL 155028 (D. Nev. Jan. 
13, 2016). 
206.   See State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872, 896 (N.J. 2011) (“Research has shown that lineup 
administrators familiar with the suspect may leak that information ‘by consciously or unconsciously 
communicating to witnesses which lineup member is the suspect.’”) (citation omitted). 
207.   Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 135 (2012).  
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unconstitutional or at least unfair.208 Putting aside constitutional 
arguments, allowing defendants and their counsel to view body camera 
footage before entering a plea would make pleas more accurate, more fair, 
and more efficient.  
The pleas would be more accurate because defendants and counsel will 
be able to determine better whether the charges are valid. In the tumble of 
the street, defendants will often not know whether they started a fight or 
finished it, resisted arrest or merely asked to be left alone. Videos that 
reveal guilt209 will encourage quick pleas; videos that tend to exonerate 
will reduce inaccurate pleas and, hopefully, simply result in a dismissal. 
And when defendants believe they were justified in their actions, they will 
know whether there is video evidence supporting their position or whether 
they would be in for an uphill climb at trial, thereby expediting the plea 
process. 
Moreover, videos will reveal whether the prosecutor has charged the 
appropriate level of crime; the government may have charged second 
degree assault when the video makes out only third degree assault. 
Pleas will be fairer if the defendant and counsel can see the state’s 
evidence. Basic notions of justice suggest that a person pleading guilty to a 
crime should see the evidence concerning that crime when there is very 
little reason to keep it secret.  
These videos will enhance efficiency. Prosecutors will dismiss cases, or 
not even bring them, when the video does not support the officer’s 
account. Judges will dismiss weak cases when prosecutors refuse to do so. 
Video recordings will lead to plea offers more in line with the facts.210 
Guilty defendants will plead more readily when confronted with strong, 
recorded evidence of guilt.  
Plea bargains often involve an agreed-upon or at least recommended 
sentence in addition to the charge. A video can help the defendant decide 
whether to accept a long sentence, or fight for a shorter one, based on the 
demonstrated strength of the government’s case. Even if a defendant is 
shown on video committing the elements of assault, there may be 
background facts caught on camera that could provide some context and, 
 
 
208.   Natapoff, supra note 138. 
209.   Solis-Morales v. State, 728 S.E.2d 253, 254 (Ga. Ct. App. 2012) (police video showed 
officer recovering keys stolen from victim from defendant’s pocket). 
210.   Although a video can be subject to biased interpretation, “in the case of eyewitness 
testimony, the viewer’s biases do not simply exert a powerful influence on how visual data is 
interpreted; they shape the visual data itself. Biases are built into the eyewitness record in a way they 
are not built into a video of the scene. Video, of course, is far from a comprehensive record of what 
occurred, but it is less likely . . . to be as skewed by emotions or personal loyalties as human memory.” 
Blitz, supra note 80, at 7.  
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in some cases, a justification such as self-defense.  
4. Defendant Access 
We also argue that defendants—and not just their counsel—should be 
able to view body camera videos before plea or trial. This follows for a 
few reasons. First, many of the fairness and efficiency arguments above 
rest upon a defendant herself viewing the video. If the video shows strong 
evidence of guilt, for example, a defendant who can view it will be more 
likely to plead guilty.  
Second, defendants will be able to better assist in their defense if they 
can view the video. They will usually know far more than the defense 
attorney, the prosecutor, or the judge about what is depicted in the video, 
and can provide context. They can assist by identifying witnesses, 
explaining to counsel what is going on in the video, and, where 
appropriate, how those events might justify his or her actions.  
Third, defendants who view videos can supplement overworked 
counsel who may not even have the time to view the video, or to view it 
with a careful eye.  
Fourth, many jurisdictions do not supply counsel to indigent defendants 
at the first appearance at all. In these jurisdictions, a defendant must 
represent himself and therefore must be entitled to view the video to carry 
out this function. He may not be able to raise carefully crafted legal 
arguments, but he should be able to identify at least more glaring problems 
with the case or the police conduct. 
Similarly, some jurisdictions allow defendants to waive counsel and 
plead guilty;211 in these cases defendants should also be permitted to view 
the video so as to determine whether to take a plea. 
Some scholars have argued more generally that defendants should play 
a greater role in their own defense to enhance legitimacy in a system that 
often makes defendants feel sidelined even, at times, by their own 
counsel.212 
5. Judges 
Our proposal also envisions judges having immediate access to videos 
 
 
211.   Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 392–93 (1993) (defendant waived counsel and pleaded 
guilty); State v. Shafer, 969 S.W.2d 719, 727 (Mo. 1998). Court must permit defendants to waive 
counsel. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 807 (1975).  
212.   Ion Meyn, Discovery and Darkness: The Information Deficit in Criminal Disputes, 79 
BROOK. L. REV. 1091, 1127–29 (2014). 
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on the bench. This access will allow judges to view the tapes sua sponte if 
they wish, or at the request of counsel. This access will allow judges to 
assess the strength of the government case in determining not only 
probable cause but, more practically, in assessing bail. It will also help 
judges to determine sentences when defendants choose to plead guilty 
early. 
E. Objections 
Scholars, courts, prosecutors, and others have often raised various 
objections to enhanced defendant discovery. This section shows why 
many of those objections do not apply to video recordings, or, if they do, 
how they can be addressed. This section then sketches objections from the 
other direction—that our proposal will harm defendants.  
1. Objections from Prosecutors 
First, some may argue that defendant discovery of body camera video 
would reveal undercover officers or confidential informants. True, such 
information may appear in police reports or other police documents, and 
for those documents the argument enjoys some force.213 But body camera 
programs usually apply, if not entirely, to uniformed police officers.214 
These videos, therefore, will generally not reveal undercover officers and 
rarely, if ever, reveal police informants. Moreover, most policies afford 
officers discretion to turn off or not to activate the videos when talking to 
informants, or could otherwise disguise their identities so as not to place 
them in danger.215  
Second, many argue discovery will reveal witnesses whom the 
defendant may intimidate, or worse.216 Michael Graham describes witness 
intimidation, in general, as a “serious obstacle” to justice, particularly in 
mafia and domestic violence cases.217 But videotapes are unlikely to reveal 
witnesses of whom the defendant is unaware. And for mob cases, or 
 
 
213.   Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 63 (1957) (recognizing privilege for informants); 
United States v. Smith, 780 F.2d 1102, 1107 (4th Cir. 1985) (“[T]he safety and security of the person 
supplying the information is best protected by nondisclosure of his identity to those who may cause 
him harm.”). 
214.   NYC Draft Regulation, supra note 8 (outlining field use of body cameras for uniformed 
officers only). 
215.   Id. at 3–4 (prohibiting recording of interviews with “current or potential confidential 
informants”). 
216.   Montoya, supra note 145 (noting that even if witness intimidation occurs, expanding 
discovery rights will rarely exacerbate this problem).  
217.   Michael H. Graham, Witness Intimidation, 12 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 239, 240 (1984). 
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complex drug investigations, in particular body cameras on uniformed 
officers will play little role. In domestic violence cases, officers will 
deactivate recording, as they will if other sensitive witnesses are present 
such as victims of a sex crime. For ordinary interviews, effective 
technology exists to mask the individual’s identity.218  
But for the vast majority of cases that are misdemeanor cases disposed 
of at first appearance by a plea or shortly thereafter, it remains very 
speculative that the defendant will view the tape, identify a previously 
unknown person as a potential witness, locate that person, and then harass 
or intimidate that witness, all in a matter of hours. If the case does not 
plead out but proceeds to trial, the defendant is ultimately entitled to know 
who the witnesses against her are when they testify.  
Some also argue defendant discovery will slow the process. Prosecutors 
must take the time to gather their own documents and scour police records 
and files for further evidence or to check for Brady material.219 This time 
and expense undoes the very value of a plea bargain: to preserve 
government resources. But our proposal will impose no additional burden 
on the government in simply providing access to defense counsel. Once a 
secure system has been established, prosecutors will not have to do any 
additional work—simply for access at least. On the contrary, once defense 
counsel has access to these videos in every case, prosecutors will no longer 
have a duty to view the videos themselves, at least for discovery purposes, 
because the defense will already have it.  
A bigger resource problem is the extra work that will be required of 
defense counsel. They will need to take time to view videos for their many 
cases involving body cameras, even though only a subset of these videos 
will likely contain relevant or useful information. To address this problem, 
public defenders could have paralegals or interns take a first pass viewing 
the videos. As discussed above, in some cases defendants themselves will 
view the tapes. Neither solution stands as a good substitute for defense 
counsel viewing the tapes, however, particularly because only lawyers can 
properly identify often complex legal issues. This therefore counts as a 
cost, but hopefully and probably one that public defenders will be happy to 
take on. 
The Supreme Court noted another reason to resist providing defendants 
discovery before plea: it will discourage them from pleading guilty. This 
 
 
218.   Id.  
219.   Merola, supra note 22. Most prosecutors surveyed believed body cameras would 
increase case preparation time and “make the discovery process more burdensome or difficult for 
them.” Id. at 5. 
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argument has little force as applied to body camera video tapes. First, in 
many cases the video will reveal the case to be quite strong and therefore 
enhance efficiency by encouraging pleas. Second, videos will show both 
parties what happened, resulting in plea offers that more accurately reflect 
what happened or what can be proven, again resulting in more efficiency 
and more accuracy.  
In some cases, the videotape will encourage the defendant to stand trial 
where the prosecutor still believes she has a strong case. In this scenario 
the videotape will make the plea system less efficient. But if both sides 
feel vindicated by the video, that is precisely the type of case that should 
be taken to trial and adjudicated by a judge or jury. Further, it is not the 
actual viewing of the tape that causes the delay but its contents. Absent 
other reasons to deprive the defendant of the truth about his case, it goes 
too far to simply say we want to encourage pleas even in cases in which a 
videotape reveals weaknesses in the government’s proof. 
The Court in United States v. Ruiz220 also hinted that not all discovery 
will contain relevant information. This is true, but why should prosecutors 
or police unilaterally decide whether a given videotape contains relevant 
information? Unlike a mountain of documents that the prosecutor might 
have to cull, a body camera video will typically involve a short interaction 
between the police and the defendant. Law enforcement is also not 
immune to cognitive biases that work to convince them that certain 
evidence is more favorable to the prosecution than it is. 
A related argument presents more problems: how to determine which 
videos should be made available with respect to a given case. To some 
extent this represents a technological problem and to some extent a 
conceptual one. As for technical issues, in the first instance the videos 
tagged as relating to a particular defendant will of course count as 
relevant. In addition, any video of the arresting officer near the time and 
place of the arrest should possibly count. We must include these videos to 
avoid police simply refusing to tag videos in connection with an arrest at 
all, or tag only some subset.  
Similarly, body camera videos of other officers on the scene should be 
produced. Again, all systems today can geotag and time stamp videos so 
that they can be quickly retrieved based on time and location. Of course, 
courts and the parties will need to develop common sense rules for how 
close in time and space will count. In cities, one can imagine videos within 
100 feet and perhaps within one hour might be relevant, but this is a rule 
that can only be developed through experience. 
 
 
220.   United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 630 (2002). 
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2. Objections from Defendants 
Finally, one could argue that our proposal will harm defendants. As 
noted above, it will more thoroughly inject these videos into ordinary 
criminal cases, normalizing their use. Moreover, body camera videos 
themselves are inherently pro-law enforcement. Our proposal might 
encourage prosecutors to view videotapes more often than they otherwise 
would have, and to the extent those videotapes favor the government case, 
will build a stronger case even at first appearance than they otherwise 
would have.221 After all, some research shows that both body camera 
videos and police interrogation videos tend to present defendants in a poor 
light, both literally and metaphorically. Perspective bias,222 poor lighting, 
and other factors make the defendant or suspect look worse than they 
would if videotaped from a neutral angle under better lighting 
conditions.223  
We take this objection seriously but it is not clear how to modify our 
proposal in light of it. We could, perhaps, prevent prosecutors and defense 
counsel from using body camera videos at all, or only in exceptional cases. 
That is, our proposed agency would refuse access to prosecutors or 
defense counsel except upon some special showing and would generally 
restrict use to cases of alleged police misconduct.  
But walling off such videos from ordinary criminal cases would likely 
be infeasible. First, simply by virtue of ordinary rules of evidence they are 
highly likely to be relevant to a criminal case. If we allow defendants to 
use body camera footage in their own defense, it would be difficult to then 
turn around and bar prosecutors from using the videos in their case in 
chief. Second, such restricted access would run counter to the rights of the 
media and others to obtain these videos by public records laws. Third, law 
enforcement and prosecutors are unlikely to agree that they will lose not 
only control over these videos but access as well.  
 
 
 
 
221.   Merola, supra note 22, at 5. Most prosecutors surveyed believe body cameras will make 
their cases stronger.  
222.   Timothy Williams, James Thomas, Samuel Jacoby & Damien Cave, Police Body 
Cameras: What Do You See?, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 2016. 
223.   Alexandra Mateescu, Alex Rosenblat & Danah Boyd, Police Body-Worn Cameras 
(February 2015) (Working Paper) (“[Video] footage sometimes fails to provide important context, and 
can be subject to biases and varying interpretations. In some cases, it may require special training to 
interpret the content of what is captured in recording."), available at https://perma.cc/UB3K-VX36.  
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F. Constitutional Constraints 
Our argument rests in policy rather than constitutional constraints. 
Nevertheless, constitutional considerations lie in the background and 
provide helpful traction on this issue. We therefore sketch that background 
here.  
Traditionally, the Supreme Court has been largely hostile to any kind of 
defendant discovery, whether pre-plea or even at trial. It has held that 
defendants have no general constitutional right to discovery.224 As a 
consequence, defendants likely do not have a general constitutional right 
to receive body camera videos. 
On the other hand, defendants do have a right to receive material, 
exculpatory evidence. Therefore, if a given video contains exculpatory 
evidence, and that evidence would be material in the context of the case 
overall, prosecutors have a duty to disclose it before trial. But the case law 
remains unclear regarding whether prosecutors must produce Brady 
material before a plea.225 
Many scholars argue that Lafler v. Cooper226 and Missouri v. Frye,227  
have recognized that the plea bargaining process is akin to trial, and that 
the Supreme Court will soon make other trial rights apply to the plea 
stage, including the right to receive Brady material before pleading guilty. 
If so, then we can begin to build an argument around a defendant’s right to 
receive exculpatory material before a plea. (Remember, the court has held 
that defendants do not have a constitutional right to discovery even at trial 
if that discovery is not materially exculpatory.)  
Thus, assuming a plea Brady right, where does that leave prosecutors 
who have access to body camera videos? If Brady applies full force, 
prosecutors will have an obligation to watch those videos. After all, Brady 
obligates prosecutors to take reasonable steps to find exculpatory material 
not only in their own files but also in police files. Under current regimes, 
body camera videos reside on police servers or in the cloud under police 
control. As a result, prosecutors will have to review all videos. 
Or, prosecutors could simply make all body camera videos available to 
defense counsel, as we propose. After all, Brady does not require 
 
 
224.   Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 622. 
225.   See United States v. Conroy, 567 F.3d 174 (5th Cir. 2009) (holding that a defendant who 
pleads guilty automatically waives Brady); see also, Smith v. United States, 876 F.2d 655, 657 (8th 
Cir. 1989). But see White v. United States, 858 F.2d 416, 422 (8th Cir. 1988) (Brady violation could 
be factor whether plea valid); Sanchez v. United States, 50 F.3d 1448, 1453 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding a 
Brady claim survives a plea); United States v. Wright, 43 F.3d 491, 496 (10th Cir. 1994). 
226.   566 U.S. 156 (2012). 
227.   566 U.S. 1 (2012). 
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prosecutors to discover all material, exculpatory evidence for the defense 
but merely to produce it. Our system of access for defense counsel will 
mean prosecutors do not have to review body camera videos in every case 
as they may otherwise have to do when reading Brady together with Frye 
and Lafler.  
Again, we root our argument primarily in policy and ordinary notions 
of accuracy, fairness, and efficiency. We merely canvas these 
constitutional arguments as a foreshadowing of what might be coming 
soon as the courts further develop the implications of Frye and Lafler. 
V. BALANCING TRANSPARENCY AGAINST OTHER INTERESTS 
This section tackles the balance between transparency and 
accountability with other interests, including law enforcement goals and 
privacy of individuals. This section first sketches the current state of 
affairs: except where specific legislation dictates otherwise,228 police 
departments generally have unilateral discretion on if and when to release 
videos to the media and the public.229 This section then discusses how our 
proposal would alter the status quo, leading to a more open and even-
handed system of disclosure to the public. Finally, this section considers 
the difficult balance between openness and individual privacy—the 
privacy of vulnerable victims. For example, it considers as well the 
privacy of individual officers as employees against unfair scrutiny or 
retaliation from supervisors.  
A. Current Regime 
Several jurisdictions have passed a law regarding body cameras, but in 
many of these places, no particular law governs the custody or rules for 
releasing body camera videos to the public230—though this landscape is 
changing quickly. Generally, police departments have taken control and 
exercise unilateral discretion in releasing these videos, limited only by 
 
 
228.   For an interactive map showing current state legislation and police department policy on 
public access to body camera footage, see Access to Police Body-Worn Camera Video, REPORTERS 
COMM. FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, https://perma.cc/84M7-XJR2.  
229.   See Kimberly Kindy & Julie Tate, Police Withhold Videos Despite Vows of 
Transparency, WASH. POST (Oct. 8, 2015), https://perma.cc/SL5Z-FXSF; Hari Sreenivasan & Wesley 
Lowery, How Do Police Decide When to Release Video Footage?, PBS NEWSHOUR (Sept. 24, 2016, 
7:44 PM), https://perma.cc/FK4K-NQJZ. Almost every body camera policy specifies that the videos 
are the property of the police. See Spivack, supra note 101. 
230.   National Conference of State Legislatures, Body-Worn Camera Law Database (Apr. 1, 
2017), https://perma.cc/6NFR-NGUC. 
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more general public records statutes; the press cannot get the material 
unless they sue. 
Police departments often resist disclosure.231 In other cases, police 
departments will disclose information or videos selectively, often in ways 
that appear to benefit the department and cast a shadow on any civilian 
victim.232  
When the Washington Post examined the forty-nine fatal police 
shootings caught on body camera between January and October of 2015, it 
found that fewer than half of them had been publicly released, and in 
several of those cases, the videos were severely cut or edited.233 Those 
videos that were publicly released almost uniformly depicted civilian 
victims who were armed, many of whom initially attacked the police234—
suggesting, at least, selective disclosure. It is crucial to note that the vast 
majority of police abuse videos that have circulated over the past few 
years have been taken by bystanders; only a very small number were taken 
by police video cameras and willingly handed over to the public by those 
police departments.235 
Police most often resist disclosure by arguing that police body camera 
videos should be exempt from disclosure under the law enforcement 
exemption.236 Most states exempt law enforcement investigative records 
 
 
231.   See, e.g., Andy Vitalicio & David Cross, Police Revise Body Camera Policy after 
Public’s Reaction; NAACP Ponders Future of Lawsuit, PASADENA NEWS NOW (Jan. 5, 2017, 6:53 
AM), https://perma.cc/Z7U9-DAYF (reporting that Pasadena Police changed their policy to allow 
release of videos only after lawsuit by NAACP, among other negative reactions); David Hinkel, City 
Delays Release of Police Shooting Video Despite 90-Day Period, CHIC. TRIB., Apr. 10, 2017, 5:09 AM 
(prosecutors sought to delay release of video past new, hard ninety-day deadline for investigative 
reasons and to protect a defendant’s right to a fair trial).  
232.   See, e.g., Rob Elgas, Police Release Video of Cop Beaten by Suspect She Feared 
Shooting, ABC7 EYEWITNESS NEWS (Oct. 14, 2016), https://perma.cc/KW7L-WHL9; Charles E. 
Ramirez, Police Release Video to ID Suspect in WSU Cop’s Death, THE DETROIT NEWS (Dec. 8, 2016, 
1:32 PM), http://perma.cc/SX4F-RLY9; Katie Rogers, Los Angeles Police Release Video of Fatal 
Shooting; Say Man Had Gun, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2016 (explaining that LAPD had released 
surveillance video purporting to show eighteen-year-old who was later shot by police holding 
handgun, but not showing shooting itself). 
233.   Kindy & Tate, supra note 232. 
234.   Phoebe Connelly, Fatal Police Shootings Captured by Body Cameras, 2015, WASH. 
POST (Oct. 8, 2015), https://perma.cc/9FU2-K5SV. 
235.   For a thorough discussion of the importance of civilian recording of police-community 
interactions, see Simonson, supra note 66. 
236.   See, e.g., IND. CODE § 5-14-3-4(b)(1) (2014) (exempting “[i]nvestigatory records of law 
enforcement agencies”); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 4, § 7, cl.26(f) (2014) (exempting “investigatory 
materials necessarily compiled out of the public view by law enforcement or other investigatory 
officials the disclosure of which materials would probably so prejudice the possibility of effective law 
enforcement that such disclosure would not be in the public interest”); W. VA. CODE § 29B-1-4(a)(4) 
(2014) (same for law enforcement records). See also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 132-1.4 (2013). NC’s law 
leaves criminal investigations records entirely in the hands of police: “[records made] in an effort to 
anticipate, prevent, or monitor possible violations of the law” can be released only at the discretion of 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol95/iss2/5
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from disclosure under their state public records law, and police argue, 
often successfully, that body camera footage constitutes such an 
investigative record eligible for exemption.237 This law enforcement 
exemption is often categorical, requiring no consideration of the public’s 
interest in that information.238 Thus, much body camera footage can 
remain out of reach of the public for years, and often indefinitely. 
The San Diego Police Department, for instance, has used the exemption 
to reject requests for body camera footage of police use of deadly force: 
one, a high-speed chase that ended after multiple officers fired on the 
driver and another, of a standoff where police shot and killed an armed and 
mentally ill veteran.239 The Los Angeles Police Department, which has 
equipped some, but not yet all, of its officers with body cameras,240 
considers the footage an investigatory record and will not release footage 
to the public unless required by a civil or criminal proceeding.241 
1. Further Restrictions Particular to Body Cameras 
Worse, some states have enacted laws protecting body camera videos 
from public disclosure, allowing police departments to withhold body 
camera footage even after an investigation is closed.242 At least 21 states 
have passed laws that directly govern the disclosure of body camera 
videos, and another 13 states have legislation pending.243 Many of these 
laws impose even more restrictions on disclosure than the ordinary law 
enforcement exemption, drawing these videos further and further from the 
public eye and away from a tool of accountability.244 
South Carolina, for example, has adopted a body camera law that 
provides a blanket exemption against disclosure. It states, “[d]ata recorded 
by a body-worn camera is not a public record subject to disclosure under 
the Freedom of Information Act.”245 Instead, the statute puts law 
 
 
the police department. Id. § 132-1.4(b)(2). 
237.   See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7). 
238.   ABRAMS INSTITUTE, POLICE BODY CAMERA FOOTAGE: JUST ANOTHER PUBLIC RECORD 
11 (2015), available at https://perma.cc/68NE-XFXH.  
239.   Id. (citing Liam Dillon, Police Body Camera Videos Will Stay Private—At Least for 
Now, VOICE OF SAN DIEGO (Mar. 19, 2014), https://perma.cc/AZC9-4J7M.  
240.   Kate Mather & David Zahniser, City Council Vote Resumes $57.6-Million Rollout of 
LAPD Body Cameras, L.A. TIMES, June 22, 2016. 
241.   See Spivack, supra note 101; Kate Mather, A Fight over Access to Video From LAPD 
Body Cameras is Shaping Up, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2015. 
242.   See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1-240(G)(1)-(3).  
243.   See Comm. for Freedom of the Press, supra note 231. 
244.   NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-04-18.7(1) (2015); S.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1-240 (G)(1) (2015). 
245.   S.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1-240(G)(1)-(3) (public disclosure is left to the discretion of the 
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enforcement in charge of deciding whether to disclose in individual cases.  
Similarly, North Carolina law expressly states that body camera 
footage is not a public record and therefore not subject to disclosure. The 
North Carolina law only allows for disclosure to individuals depicted in 
the recording or their representatives.246 Others, such as the media, 
concerned citizens, or other government agencies, can obtain such 
recordings only upon petition showing a compelling interest or other good 
cause.247 Oregon exempts body camera recordings from disclosure unless 
public interest requires such disclosure.248  
On the other hand, a small handful of jurisdictions have very recently 
begun to craft more liberal disclosure rules for body camera videos, and 
have thereby created better accountability mechanisms. For instance, in 
response to public outcry over the Laquan MacDonald video, Chicago 
imposed a new policy that requires mandatory and automatic public 
release of video related to a critical incident within sixty days of the 
incident, or at an earlier date when possible.249 But even Chicago envisions 
that police body camera video will remain under the ownership and 
control of the police.250  
B. Transparency Versus Law Enforcement 
Our proposal to entrust videos with a police accountability agency, and 
to ensure these videos fulfill their original promise of accountability, will 
significantly change the existing balance.  
First, as to the substantive rule, we would urge one far more permissive 
of disclosure than the prevailing trend in many states—at least to those 
depicted on tape interacting with the police, or in high-profile cases. States 
ought not consider body camera videos to be exempt from disclosure as 
law enforcement records, even pending trial. Body camera programs are 
primarily funded as a tool to hold the police accountable, and not solely as 
a tool of ordinary law enforcement; police should therefore not be able to 
resist disclosure by substituting the secondary reason for the primary 
reason. Such a switch will erode, rather than build, trust between the 
community and the police.  
 
 
State Law Enforcement Division, the Attorney General, or a circuit solicitor). 
246.   N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 132-1.4A(b), (c) (West Supp. 2016). 
247.   Id. § 132-1.4A(f)(1). 
248.   H.B. 2517, 78th Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2015). 
249.   Hinkel, supra note 234 (noting the policy permits one thirty-day extension). 
250.   POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY TASK FORCE, supra note 132; Scher & Spierer, supra note 
102. Before a video is made public, however, the individuals depicted or described in the footage (or 
the family or legal representative if the individual is deceased) must be given notice. Id. 
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In addition, we would urge repeal of those state statutes that impose 
restrictions on disclosure of body camera videos beyond the existing 
public records exceptions. These statutes undermine the purpose of 
accountability under the guise of law enforcement needs.  
Our proposed substantive rule would mean that for most misdemeanor 
or minor felony cases, our proposed agency should release videos even in 
the unlikely case that release would somehow interfere with law 
enforcement prosecution of an individual defendant. Again, these videos 
play only a secondary role as law enforcement tools.  
But in most cases, release of the videos will not interfere with 
prosecution of misdemeanors or minor felonies especially since video 
editing technology can effectively mask the identities of those depicted in 
the videos. In more serious or high-profile crimes, law enforcement will 
have the chance to show the agency why it should not release videos 
immediately. Police may argue they need a more days to interview 
witnesses, when the release of the video might taint their memory of 
events. Or police might show how releasing the video would identify 
vulnerable witnesses even after appropriate disguising measures have been 
taken.  
But in the vast majority of videos from uniformed police body cameras, 
these situations will not arise. 
C. Transparency versus Privacy 
Privacy presents far greater challenges, but balancing privacy against 
transparency largely goes beyond the scope of this Article, which has 
focused on the balance between law enforcement and accountability. We 
will leave for others, or for another day, the best way to balance disclosure 
against the privacy interests of bystanders, vulnerable victims, suspects, 
defendants, or indeed individual police officers themselves, beyond noting 
the availability of and need for effective redaction of identifying markers.  
We must similarly leave aside for now how best to consider how the 
privacy-accountability balance applies in minority neighborhoods that face 
the largest police presence. Even as we outfit officers with body cameras 
in these neighborhoods in particular to deter misconduct, we 
simultaneously subject these neighborhoods to greater electronic 
surveillance.251 
 
 
251.   See Developments in the Law, supra note 75, at 1794–1817 (2015), ("[A]lthough police 
body cameras have the potential to benefit citizens and officers alike, they nevertheless represent 
another substantial step toward a surveillance state. Police departments in recent decades have become 
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Finally, any accounting for privacy will have to ensure that body 
camera programs, and the thousands of videos they generate, will not 
become part of a mass surveillance program, cataloging videos in 
searchable databases, with facial recognition software, that will lead to 
evils identified elsewhere in the literature.252  
CONCLUSION 
Police body cameras programs hold great promise to enhance police 
accountability. They can deter police misconduct and expose abuses, 
especially in high-profile cases in which the community demands 
transparency and justice. They hold the most promise in highly patrolled 
neighborhoods, often low-income neighborhoods of color. 
But this promise faces a new, hidden challenge that we have examined 
and exposed here: the police have taken control over these programs, 
along with sole ownership of the body camera videos themselves. This 
control threatens to undermine the goal of accountability and exacerbate 
the unfairness already present in the criminal justice process.  
We have shown how police control determines how to configure and 
use body camera systems. Studies have shown that the more discretion 
police have to stop filming, or to never start filming, the less that program 
deters misconduct.253 Similarly, police ownership of videos has led to 
countless, often infamous cases of the police refusing to release videos, or 
selectively releasing them in ways designed to protect their reputation 
rather than promote accountability and enhance community trust. 
Even as police control erodes accountability, it magnifies the unfairness 
that already infects the criminal justice system. True, police body camera 
videos contain evidence of ordinary crimes, and therefore may play an 
appropriate role in prosecuting those crimes. But police ownership has 
meant that this evidence becomes available to police and prosecutors in 
preparing cases, bringing charges, and even preparing for trial, while 
defendants and defense counsel cannot get access to the same evidence in 
time to make bail arguments, consider plea deals, or even in some cases 
 
 
increasingly militarized . . . . Facial recognition software in particular may pose a threat to civilian 
privacy when coupled with body cameras."); see also, e.g., Frederick Melo, St. Paul City Council Gets 
an Earful on Police Body Camera Pilot Project, PIONEER PRESS (Nov. 2, 2016, 9:11 PM), 
https://perma.cc/4XRQ-EL5G. 
252.   Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Big Data and Predictive Reasonable Suspicion, 163 U. PA. 
L. REV. 327, 330 (2015); Marc Jonathan Blitz, Video Surveillance and the Constitution of Public 
Space: Fitting the Fourth Amendment to a World that Tracks Image and Identity, 82 TEX. L. REV. 
1349, 1374–98 (2004). 
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prepare for suppression motions or trial. 
These two related outgrowths of police control have led to an unsettling 
irony: over-policing, misconduct, and killings in low-income 
neighborhoods have largely motivated body camera programs in hopes of 
accountability and deterrence. Yet these programs have drifted to aiding in 
that same law enforcement of those same neighborhoods without helping 
to reduce incidents of police misconduct and increase accountability and 
mutual trust.   
We have proposed a novel and perhaps radical solution that restores 
body camera programs to their chief purpose: accountability. We propose 
shifting ownership and control of all body camera videos from police 
departments to a neutral police accountability agency. This agency would 
grant access to police videos according to neutral rules that favor 
disclosure with a primary eye toward accountability.  
Of course, even though the primary goal of body camera programs is 
accountability, the police videos, as a secondary matter, do become 
evidence relevant to ordinary law enforcement. As a consequence, our 
proposed police accountability agency will disclose these videos for 
ordinary criminal cases as well. But it will do so on a fair, symmetrical 
basis—affording defense counsel and defendants immediate access to 
these videos via a secure web link—early enough so that defendants can 
make an informed plea. In this way, and only in this way, body cameras 
can serve both goals: accountability and law enforcement. 
Our proposal sketches the technical logistics of this early defense 
access, in time for first appearance or arraignment, and shows why such 
early access will lead to more just, accurate, and efficient criminal justice 
outcomes. Such timely access will impose little, if any, costs on police 
efficiency or safety to witnesses or the community. Our proposed regime 
will represent a sea-change in how defendants and defense counsel 
currently prepare for bail hearings, plea bargains and trial, while allowing 
body camera programs to fulfill their primary purpose: accountability.  
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